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The historical s uccess or failure of any policy is 
measured by the actual outcome of events, but that 
success or failure is not determined by prescience 
or wisdom, by right or wrong. The course of 
history, of victory and defeat, is circumscribed by 





On July 14, 1936, the French people celebrated the anniversary 
of the French Revolution with exceptional optimism. The Popular Front 
of France, headed by the socialist L~n Blum, had been elected two 
months before. Its primary support, the workers, were confident in 
the new government's willingness to alleviate their mounting poverty. 
Within six weeks of ooaUng to power, the Popular Front proved itself 
able to negotiate with employers and union leaders with the 
significant Matignon labor reform agreements. More than one million 
Parisians including Blum and his cabinet marched past the monument of 
the Commune, up the Rue de Rivoli, towards the Place de la Nation, 
al ternately singing the "Marseillaise" and the "Internationale," 
waving banners of "Vive Blum", "Vive Ie Front Populaire."l 
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"Never, " wrote the edi tors of the Vendredi, a left-wing 
political and literary weekly, "was the Place so beautiful. ,,2 Blum, 
fist raised, preceded his ministers on the podium, over a huge poster 
of Jean Jaur€s subtitled "Down with War! Long Live Peace!" He 
addressed "workers, people of the countryside, small proprietors, 
small investors, shopkeepers , that the Popular Front has gathered 
together": "On this day July 14, let us swear to uphold the 
revolutionary chant: 'Friends, let us always remain united' (Applause 
and bravos) ••• The will to unity must rest among us as the rule and the 
pact. ,,3 The Vendredi captured the enthusiasm of the audience: 
Saint-Just said happiness was a new idea. Today in 
the Paris ~ir, we breathed the novelty and birth of 
that idea. 
Four days later, in the Hotel Matignon, meeting with a 
delegation of teachers and union leaders, Blum received a dispatch 
from the French Ambassador in Spain reporting that a military revolt 
had erupt~ in Spanish Morocco. 5 "There are new complications ahead," 
Blum told the delegation. nIf we succeed in what v.ve are undertaking , 
no one will be able to say that events made our task any easier. ,,6 
./ 
On July 20, the Premier of the Spanish Republic, Jose Giral, 
sent Blum a telegram for arms and planes. Spain's Frente Popular, 
older than France ' s by only a few weeks, seemed to be a natural ally. 
Was Blum to aid the Spanish Republlc? Assisting a legitimate 
government was in keeping with international law. Strategically, 
after Germany and Italy, a third potentially hostile front was a 
menace to France's security. Yet at the same time, the Popular Front 
had itself sworn to "defend' dezoocratic liberties • •• and to give peace 
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to the world's hurnanity.,,7 Blum bnmediately met with his cabinet on 
the 20th and in fact did approve a shipment of planes. However within 
two weeks, he was to put forth a policy of "nonintervention" in Spain, 
and to call for the other European powers, primarily England, the 
USSR, Italy, and Germany to abide by it. 
Why did Blum respond the way he did? 
"All his life," wrote Joel Colton, a distinguished biographer of 
Blum, "his socialism and his republican patriotism were fused into a 
single mold." In Blum's speeches, actions and later testimonies "he 
attempted to demonstrate the harmony and consistency of the two 
ideals. ,,8 
How did Blum, then, adapt his republican patriotism, and 
responsibility to France ' s national defense, to his long-held 
socialist principles of internationalism, and pacifism in the crisis 
of the Spanish Civil War? 
Was the government personally responsible for the choice? 
Blum's humanist, denx:>cratic socialism was directly inspired by 
Jaures's harmony of socialism and patriotism. But had the world 
climate of 1936 rendered this harmony obsolete? As Blum's most recent 
-biographer, Jean Lacouture, put it, how could Blum "identify the 
conflict between ~rialisms of 1914 with the unilateral threat which 
Nazism represented?,,9 
Finally, did Blum have any viable alternatives in dealing with 
Spain? Was nonintervention avoidable? 
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Keeping these questions in mind, this study will investigate 
Blum's response to the Spanish Civil War. Contemporaries and later 
scholars have differed in their assessments of this response. 
First, Blum's most recent biographers, Colton and Lacouture, 
maintain that his fear of taking risks prevented him fram taking a 
strong stance in support of the Spanish Republic. Blum's perception 
of his duties as a democratic leader within a coalition government 
were reinforced by his personal qualities. Writes Colton, "his desire 
not to offend political allies or even strong opponents, his role as 
conciliator and advocate of compromise, his strong sense of moral 
integrity, his faith in the integrity of others" limited Blum's vision 
of alternatives to nonintervention. lO Colton and Lacouture accuse Blum 
of a naive and misguided faith in the cooperation of national leaders, 
borne of his socialist ideals. The nonintervention policy embodies 
the tragedy of this faith. 
To other contemporaries and Blum, the nonintervention policy was 
the only alternative to civil war in France. Anthony Eden related in 
his memoirs an interview with the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Senhor 
Monteiro, who had corne away fram France "apprehensive." "He would be 
much relieved if France got through the next few months without some 
serious internal conflict." "Monteiro," Eden went on, "was one of the 
first to think that France might be shattered, because the hatreds 
within the country were greater than the hatred of same Frenchmen for 
the foreign enemy."il 
WOuld a majority of the French have followed Blum into Spain? 
Blum said it was impossible for him to risk war without the consent of 
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public opinion.12 But according to Blum's former Minister of Aviation, 
the working class "would have willingly given up the advent of an 
unquestionnably just social legislation to help the Spanish 
Republic.,,13 
Thirdly, still other historians view Blum's policy from the 
perspective of dissension within the Popular Front itself. Lacouture 
argues, for example, that since the Communist Party refused to 
participate in the cabinet, Blum's political stand depended on 
alliance with the more moderate Radical Party. 
When one considers that the t\',Q most influential 
Radical ministers in the circumstances, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Delbos) and the 
Minister of National Defense (Daladier), became, 
respectively the symbol and the defender of 
nonintervention, it is justifiable to say that in 
the Spanish affair, the Radical party, half the 
Popular Front on the governmental level, exercised 
an invincible force of obstruction. Any policy 
claiming to provide long-term aid for the Spanish 
Republic would obviously have led to a cabinet 
crisis andl4a breaking of the Popular Front "contract." 
Hew "obvious" was the threat of the Radical Party? 
Fourthly, same explain that Blum advocated nonintervention aware 
that a rebel victory was likely, that Italy and Germany would have 
sent more arms to Spain anyway, and that the French mili tary 
establishment supported the Franquists. Did Blum accurately gauge the 
strategic threat? How much authority did Blum exert over the 
military, and did this affect his decision? "While prepared to 
justify his policy in terms of military exigencies, it seems unlikely 
he was so susceptible to their dictates, " observes historian Robert 
Young. He adds a "stunning fact": 
••• in this crucial three-week period, preceding the 
nonintervention decision, the government failed to 
consult the French chiefs of staff on the precise 
nature of the strategic menace or on the ki~s of 
operations which could be mounted against it. 
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The last prevailing argument is that the British government 
forced nonintervention on France. "Rightly or wrongly," wrote Pierre 
Cot,"it looked as if the non-intervention policy v-uuld be the only way 
of preventing England from aiding Franco."16 On the other hand, 
others, such as the British Minister in Paris, Hugh Lloyd Thomas, 
confirmed this rU£l'K)r was goverrunent-directed, to "appease the 
hostility of the extreme elements within their country, which looked 
like getting them into international complications. ,,17 
This thesis will an~wer the above questions in an attempt to 
assess the major reasons for Blum's response to the Spanish Civil War. 
CHAPI'ER 1 
Overview of the Origins of French Nonintervention 
in the Spanish Civil War 
I remember once saying to Arthur Koestler, IIHistory 
stopped in 1936, II at which he nodded in irrmediate 
understanding. We were both thinking of 
totalitarianism in general, but more particularly 
of the Spanish Civil war l - G. Orwell 
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liThe Spanish affair had for me the character of a veritable 
./ 
theatrical coup," recalled Leon Bltnn, the Socialist head of the 
Popular Front in France, elected just forty days before the outbreak 
of Civil War in Spain. 2 The Spanish Civil War was to became the 
central foreign policy issue of the Popular Front in the years 
1936-1938. Minister of Aviation, Pierre Cot, later interpreted the 
unfolding crisis to have been "the first act of the European war .113 
In 1936, a general election in Spain brought to power the Frente 
Popular, a coalition government of the left similar to that of France. 
Spain, however, lacking the Republican tradition of France am only 
precariously maintaining a democracy since 1931, began to experience 
instability.4 A military uprising, long in preparation, ignited on the 
immediate pretext of the assassination of a rightist leader on July 
8 
13, 1936. On July 18, General Franco flew to Morocco to assume 
cormtand of the rebel forces, and on the same day, Moroccan trCX>ps 
began to arr i ve on the Spanish Mainland. 
On Monday, July 20, Blum found a yell<:M telegram on his desk 
from the Spanish head of goverrnnent, JOs({ Giral: "Surprised by 
dangerous military coup, ask you to arrange immediately with us 
supplies of weap:::>ns and planes. Fraternally yours, Giral. 115 
The request was not problematic. A legitbnate goverrnnent was 
under siege. 6 In addition, the Laval goverrnnent had signed a trade 
agreement with Spain "providing for the delivery of French war 
materiel to Madrid up to the value of 20 million francs.,,7 Between 
July 20 and 22 Blum had met with Minister of Defense Edouard Daladier; 
Pierre Cot; Yvon Delbos, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and with Vincent 
Auriol, Minister of Finance. All agreed to comply pranptly with the 
request, noting the danger that would arise from a new fascist state 
in Europe. 
Ambassador Carde'iYas, a supporter of the Franquists, resigned 
when he learned the French goverrnnent was to send planes and 
anmunition to the Republicans. 8 Already, the French senate was beset 
with "serious emotion" against sending the arms, because of the 
"precedent it would set" for other nations to likewise embroil 
themselves in the conflict, noted the adjunct director of p:::>litical 
affairs to the Quai d'Orsay, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs . 9 
Once Carden~.s had violated the Popular Front I s secrecy, the 
rightist press reacted to the news with predictable hostility. 
L'Action Francaise and L'Echo de Paris had already taken the side of 
3 
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the catholic and anti-Cammunist rebels. "Will the French Popular 
Front dare to arm the Spanish Popular Front?," demanded L'Echo de 
Paris. 10 
While the news of the Popular Front ' s sale of Potez planes to 
the Spanish government reached the Parliament and the press, Blum had 
left for London on July 22 to discuss Hitler's remilitarization of the 
Rhineland, and the Belgian request to drop out of the Locarno 
agreements and declare neutrality. A French reporter, Pertinax, asked 
Blum whether he was going to seoo arms to Spain. When Blum replied in 
the affirmative, Pertinax warned, "You know that that is not well 
viewed here."ll Although Spain was never officially discussed at the 
talks, eleven years later, Blum told the parliamentary Investigative 
Commission that Secreta~y of State in the Foreign Office, Anthony 
Eden, privately cautioned him to be "prudent.,,12 
Blum returned to Paris the evening of the 24th to find the 
political clbnate in France had changed. Both the leftist and 
rightist press expressed their own positions on the civil war in Spain 
and on the extent to which France should react. The representatives 
in Parliament also voiced their concerns. French workers greeted Blum 
with an "ovation" at the airport, singing the "Internationale" with 
raised fists , noted the Socialist newspaper, Le Populaire. 13 The 
President of the Senate, Jules J eanneney, however, was more somber: 
How can you do that? No one here understands. It 
is not a political question, we are not looking for 
an excuse to oppose you, but the idea that you are 
getting us involved in an enterprise of which we 
know not the consequences, the idea that we might 
be led into a war for Spain, while last March 7, we 
hesitated and finally retreated when the issue 
involved military reoccupation of the Rhineland, a 
more direct and immediate issue of security to 
France, that is something here no one can 
understand. On what conditions will you get 
involved there? We knav in London - I do not say 
your position is disapproved -- but we know here 
that if there were to be any international 
ccmplications £¥ our intervention, England would 
not support us. 
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The President of the Chamber, Edouard Herriot, likewise warned Blum 
not to "meddle" in Spain's affairs. lS 
On Saturday, July 2S, Blum held the first of three cabinet 
meetings on Spain. It became more and more difficult for him to 
proceed with the open arms sales in the face of mounting opposition. 
The hesitating cabinet discussed the possibility of discreet arms 
sales though Mexico. According to Jiminez de Asua, assistant to the 
new Ambassador, Britain was pressuring France to remain neutral. 16 
Ambassador Alvaro de AlbOrnoz and Fernando de los Rios, however, were 
convinced that Blum must remain in office, and proposed tearing up the 
check already submi tted in payment to the Ministry of War, in Blum's 
presence. Asua opposed this, explaining that a socialist opposition 
in Parliament would be much more influential than the Socialist 
presence in the coalition government. The Ambassador and de los Rios 
eventually won, however. The Spanish diplomats were not as unanlinous 
in wanting to keep Blum in paver as same historians have tried to 
argue. 17 
Negrin, the leader of the Spanish Republic, gives a different 
account. According to him, the French "informed the Spanish 
Government that their (the Popular Front's) resignation would depend 
on what we (the Spanish government) considered most useful and most 
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favorable for our struggle and our cause," The Spanish government 
ministers discussed the possible consequences of a Blum resignation. 
Everyone - except for me (Negrin) -- was convinced 
that the war would last for a few days, or at most 
for a few weeks. Everyone - myself included -
believed that the replacement of the Blum 
government could be fatal for us, less because of 
the difficulties in obtaining arms ••• than because 
of the consequences which a ccx:>ling, or worse a 
reversal of France's sympathetic attitude toward 
Spain might have on the international situation, 
which might, in a short time, produce the 
strangling of the Republic. Later, when we learned 
that the solution had been in accordance with our 
wishes, we bre~~hed freely and carmented on our 
narrow escape. 
With or without the nonintervention proposal, Lacouture concludes, 
"What remains is the uncertainty that in the eyes of most of the 
Spanish Republicans, uncertain friends in Paris were better than 
opponents. ,,19 
According to Cot, "The possibility of denouncing the treaty 
which allowed the Spanish government to buy arms in France was never 
considered for a manent at the meeting of July 25.,,20 If so the 
following day's cabinet press release contradicts him: 
The French government, after the deliberations of 
the cabinet, has unaniIrously decided not to 
intervene in the internal conflicts of Spain. This 
position, proposed by M. Yvon Delbos, was 
unanimouslyawroved. Finally, on the question of 
the supply of war materiel which the Spanish 
government is said to have requested, it was 
declared in official circles at the conclusion of 
the cabinet meeting: it is false that the French 
government has affirmed i2f determination to follow 
a policy of intervention. 
The Spanish government "is said" to have requested? The carmuniqu{ 
implies an armed "intervention" Spain was not calling for. The 
""-
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cabinet resolved, according to Cot, to use the eight-day period 
necessary for collecting the shipment of arms requested by the Spanish 
government, to debate on foreign policy in the Chamber, and so that 
England might learn of the true danger of a fascist government in 
. hOO . . 22 . . , t lbos neIg rIng SpaIn. ForeIgn MInIs er De , however, conscious of 
British and Parliamentary objections, became a bona-fide supporter of 
partial nonintervention. On July 26, the day after the cabinet 
meeting, he sent a telegram to Vincent Auriol, the Finance Minister, 
forbidding all exports of war materiel to Spain. 23 The first steps 
toward an all-inclusive policy of nonintervention had been taken. 
On July 30, news reached the Quai d' Or say that two Italian 
planes secretly headed to aid Franco were accidentally found east of 
Morocco. 24 Some were apparently ordered July 17, before the 
uprising.25 Blum felt more "at ease"; this proof of intervention freed 
him from rightist warnings that Italian action was provoked by French 
aid to the Republicans. 26 He went before the Foreign Affairs 
Commission of the Senate announcing that if Germany and Italy overtly 
aided the rebels, France \\Quld continue to sell arms to the 
Republicans. But instead of assuring the Popular Front "freedan of 
action" (since Italy had "started it"), the Parliament and the 
rightist press remained violently against selling arms. Charles 
Maurras of L'Action Franlaise argued that the intervention of other 
countries in Spain gave France no right to similarly intervene and 
provoke international war. He and other reporters, framthe left as 
well as the right, feared an ideological conflict of the "whites and 
the reds" in Spain \\Quld provoke and highlight the dissensions within 
each European country.27 
l3 
On August 31, the deputies debated, some claiming the rebel 
generals "were fighting the attempt to sovietize their country. ,,28 At 
the second cabinet meeting of August 1, Delbos informed Blum that the 
British still preferred the Franco forces, and that in the name of 
Anglo-French amity, they advised that strict neutrality be observed. 29 
While Blum continued to assert, "Our duty requires that we aid 
our Spanish friends, whatever the consequences of this support may 
be,,,30 a ~romise was eventually proposed whereby France would 
retain some "freedom of action" to send shipnents if the Germans and 
Italians continued to intervene. Delbos proposed to send out an 
appeal to the European nations which would lead to the adoption of 
"corrmon rules of nonintervention.,,31 This plan had first been 
formulated by Alexis Leger of the Foreign Office. Leger felt it was 
"the best available insurance against the spread of the conflict. u32 
The British replied favorably on August 4, asking that all the 
European powers be incorporated into this agreement. France only 
received a "vague" response fran Germany on the 5th, and Delbos 
advanced a new rewording that all governments prohibit "direct or 
indirect exports, reexportation and transit, going to Spain, Spanish 
possessions and Spanish Morocco I all arms, muni tions and mater ials of 
war, as well as aircrafts, assembled or disassembled, and all 
warships. ,,33 
At the same time the diplomats were formulating the 
nonintervention policy, Cot, Daladier, and Jules Mach continued to 
send arms and planes to Spain over Deltx:>s ' s . author i ty • Blum was 
trying to persuade his colleague of the British Labour Party, David 
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Noel-Baker, to attempt in turn to influence the British admiralty of 
the danger of a Frariquist victory to both countries. Blum also sent 
Admiral Darlan to attempt to convince Lord Chatfield, First Admiral, 
of these dangers and to propose France and Britain mediate between the 
two sides in Spain. Chatfield said he WaS unaware of Darlan's 
strategic information. While wanting to keep channels open to any new 
information, he rejected Darlan's proposal. 34 
Darlan, in his account, said he told Chatfield that neither 
fascism nor corrmunism would be favorable in Spain; "the best solution 
for Anglo-French interests would be a democratic goverrnnent in Madr id, 
inclusive of different elements of the population.,,35 Yet Chatfield on 
his side recorded Darlan to have said "anxiously" that France "did not 
wish either a Fascist or ~ammunist Government in Spain, yet one ~ the 
other seemed inevitable (emphasis mine). ,,36 Evidently, conservative 
Britain and the Popular Front perceived the ramifications of the Civil 
War differently. The British essentially sought neutrality.37 
The failure of the Darlan mission had a "considerable influence" 
on Blum. 38 He had another reason to feel "abandoned": only 
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union sympathized with the Loyalists to 
the point of consider ing active aid. French public opinion, as the 
press reflected, became more deeply divided. By the third cabinet 
meeting on August 8, Blum was tempted to resign, but was urged to 
remain in power by de los Rios and Asua. 39 
On August 7 Sir George Clerk, British Ambassador to France, 
spoke with Delbos to review plans for nonintervention. At that point 
no clear word had yet arr i ved from Germany, and Delbos said in view of 
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the "already known provision of Italian aircraft to the insurgents and 
of the despatch of twenty-eight German aeroplanes from Hamburg to the 
same destination," France would go through with sending out the five 
Dewoitine aircraft already ordered. Nevertheless, Clerk warned Delbos 
that Britain could not guarantee her involvement if France were sucked 
into the Spanish war: 
I concluded the interview by expressing the hope 
that the French Government, even though, pending an 
agreement of nonintervention, they might feel 
themselves precluded from stopping private 
commercial transactions with Spain would do what it 
could to limit and retard such transactions as much 
as p::>ssible. I asked M. Deloos to forgive me for 
speaking so frankly and I repeated that all I had 
said was entirely personal and on my own 
rep::>nsibility but I felt that in so critical a 
situation I must put before him the danger of any 
action which might definitely commit the French 
government to one side of the conflict and make 
more difficult' the cooperation between o~ two 
countries which was called for by this crisis. 0 
Clerk had a marked affect on DelOOs, as he revealed on August 7, 
at the fateful third and final cabinet meeting on intervention that 
summer. 41 The cabinet became firmly divided, with Deloos on the one 
hand convinced of the wisdom of nonintervention, and Cot as firmly 
against it. DelOOs nON proposed suspending, "wi thout exception," 
commercial as well as military aircraft to Spain. He sent such an 
order to Auriol on the 9th and never rescinded it. 42 The meeting with 
Clerk and the failure of the Darlan mission left Deloos with no 
illusions about British support for France should she became involved 
in a conflict over Spain. He was nON commdtted to total 
nonintervention. He even threatened to resign and pr0voke a 
ministerial crisis if the plan was not adopted. 43 For all intents and 
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purposes the embargo had now became a unilateral French action. Many 
critics have seen the embargo itself as intervention. 44 
On August 15, the policy was officially endorsed by Great 
Britain but Germany and Italy vacillated, buying time to continue 
maneuvers in Spain. Ironically, Germany eventually signed the 
agreement because she did not think she could compete against the 
combined forces of France, Britain, and the USSR. 45 
Delbos reasoned the fascists could intervene more effectively. 
Why did he think so? In the London Times, same months before leaving 
office in 1938, Delbos explained it was "known that the British 
goverrunent, which had hardly initiated its gigantic rearmament 
program, was determined to pursue a policy of strictest neutrality. 
But although determined , neither to follow nor support France by 
furnishing arms, it was prepared to join with her in the enforcement 
of nonintervention.,,46 
A European Nonintervention Committee was established in 
September in London to enforce the policy. It attempted to devise 
schemes for supervising an arms embargo on Spain that could be 
observed by all interested powers. But the deliberations were 
unproducti ve. The Corrmittee, historian Dreifort writes, "merely 
served as a useful diplomatic safety valve anO a smoke screen behind 
which intervention occurred.,,47 Mussolini especially made no secret of 
the arms and "volunteers" he was sending to Spain. 
The policy of nonintervention predictably began to fall apart, 
having been violated from the start. A German ship, the Kamerun, was 
attacked by the Spanish coast guard and forbidden to dock on August 
'- I 
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18; to France's and Br i tain' s relief, Germany did not retaliate. BlLnn 
began to be harassed at popular Front rallies for not materially 
supporting Republican Spain. Cries of "BlLnn to action" interspersed 
B1Lnn's speech in Luna Park on September 6, the day news was received 
that Nationalist troops destroyed the Basque town of Irun on the 
Spanish/French border. 
In the winter of 1936-37, the British and French governments 
officially prohibited "volunteers" fran going to Spain, but this also 
proved ineffectual. Rurrors circulated of German presence in Morocco 
in January 1937. In Delbos' s absence, Pierre Vienot convened the 
chiefs of staff to prepare for a possible military respon$e. Britain 
and the United States approved this firm stand and Hitler backed 
down. 48 BlLnn was to remain "convinced" that "the risks of war were 
real" - particularly referring to the Kamerun and January incidents 
as well as to the later bombing of the Deutschland and the German 
retaliation b¥ the bombing of a Republican town late in the Spring of 
1937. "If the risks of war were avoided," he stated, "it is in a 
large measure due eo the lessening of international tension by our 
initiative of nonintervention.,,49 
In the Spring of 1937 BlLnn called for "relaxed nonintervention": 
"We voluntarily and systematically closed our eyes to the contraband 
of arms."SO Still, the French contraband was not nearly canparable in 
volLnne to the German and Italian aid. On June 19 a fourth incident 
occurred. Hitler announced that Spain tried to ~rpedo the cruiser 
Leipzig. In the middle of this crisis and exchange of accusations, the 
BlLnn government fell. The bnmediate reason for BlLnn's resignation lay 
18 
in his disagreement with the conservative Senate over his proposed 
economic policy to counter the new fiscal crisis. However, "It was 
the international tension as much as anything else," Blum maintained, 
that deterred him from an all-out fight with the Senate. 5l 
The Radical Daladier-Bonnet leadership of the still lingering 
Popular Front joined Britain in reaffirming nonintervention. Soon 
after the Anschluss, the extension of German control over Austria, the 
short-lived second Blum ministry of March 1938 began to advocate 
mili tary aid to the Republicans, but it was too late. Barcelona and 
then Madrid, in March 1939, fell. 
CHAPTER 2 
/ Leon Blum 
If one were to write the intellectual history of 
our century ••• in the form of a biography of a 
single person, aiming at no IOC>re than a 
metaphorical approximation to what actually 
happened in the minds of men, this person's mind 
would stand revealed as having been forced to turn 
full circle not once but twice, first when he 
escaped from thought into action, or rather having 
acted, - forced him back into thought. 
- H. Arendt, Between Past and Future 1 
19 
"Have I changed in three IOC>nths? , " Le6n Blum implored the 
restless crowd of French workers that wondered about the Popular 
Front's commitment to Spain's legitimate Republic. The day that he 
could no longer reconcile his two duties as head of government and as 
militant Socialist, he answered that day in Luna Park, September 1936, 
was the day he could no longer in gcxx1 conscience remain in power. 2 
How did Blum ideologically reconcile the socialist imperative of 
international worker solidarity, with his obligation as France's 
democratically-elected leader to national security? Was Blum prepared 
in his own mind to aid the Spanish government at the risk of internal 
and external dissension and war? In other words, were there 
\ 
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ideological precedents to Blum's justification for nonintervention? 
If so, were they still relevant to 1936? Or if Blum did sacrifice his 
Socialist principles, was it by choice or by reluctant submission to 
outside opposition? 
Appeasement, an over-used, all-encompassing word, has never had 
fewer than two connotations: 1), a peaceful settlement of legitimate 
grievances through calculated but well-intentioned compromise or 2), a 
slavish abandonment of principles and interests in the face of terror 
and threats. 3 If the France of 1936 could have afforded to run the 
risks of war, confident that Hitler could be defeated, charges against 
Blum's moral cowardice could be warranted. If such were not the case, 
if the conviction that France could not defeat Germany grew with the 
approach of war, then Blum's efforts rrdght be seen in a more favorable 
light. It is to this latter possibility that this thesis and this 
chapter turn, and be the relationship between Blum's principles and 
heM they affected, or were affected by, the varying perceptions of the 
fascist threat in Spain. 
At first, Blum strongly supported selling the requested arms be 
the Spanish Republic. But with mounting opposition in conservative 
circles at home and in Britain, among pacifists on the Left, and in 
the Popular Front cabinet, Blum resorted to negotiating with Hitler 
and Mussolini. To the Left he argued that if the legitimate 
government were aided, the fascist rebels would get much more aid from 
Germany and Italy; besides, France could not renege on an agreement 
that Germany, Italy, Britain, and France, as well as the Soviet Union, 
had signed to insure the peace of Europe. 4 At the same time, the 
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center and Right were pacified for the time being when he said the 
initiative was French, that it prevented an isolated and divided 
France, and that he himself was a patriot. 5 In this light, Blum 
skillfully justified (at least until 1938, when the Anschluss of 
Germany and Austria convinced Blum of Hitler's intentions) a very 
controversial policy before a polarizing France. He did so not out of 
an evolutionist belief in "class collaboration," or "sacred union" as 
some on the Left have suggested,6 nor out of Kerensky-like weakness as 
the Right had maintained,7 nor out of ideological blindness and 
nai vete , as Col ton and others have accused. As we will see in this 
chapter, Blum was part of France's Scx:ialist tradition, which 
considered itself the legitimate offspring of the French Revolution. 
Socialism and Republicanism had always been compatible and correct to 
Blum. They were part of the faith ~of revolutionary France in the 
justice of social democracy and in the moral leadership of a 
politically liberated proletariat. 
Internationalism and patriotism were also reconcilable to Blum. 
The development of liberty, equality, and fraternity within each 
nation \'K)uld both precede, and coexist wi th, a League of Nations. 
"That international organization," he said in 1917, "will rest on an 
ensemble of free nations, by free will, preserved in their integrity 
and in their development by general accord, by collective strength."8 
Peace, then, was not the primary value over national security. 
National security rested in the defense of liberties within one' s 
nation. A free nation \'K)uld lead to the eventual federation of all 
free nations. Therefore, internal dissension, to Blum, was 
inextricably linked with international tensions. 
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What did it mean for Blum to be a Socialist before 1934, before 
the Rassemblement Populaire? Blum's commitment to Socialism in France 
actively began with his support of Alfred Dreyfus. The explosive 
Affair divided intellectuals and polarized households; it pitted 
Republicans against the militarists, monarchists, the Church, and 
antisemites. A similar split of Left and Right was to mark France 
during the Spanish Civil War, among other issues during the Third 
Republic. Although Blum himself played a minor role in the Affair (as 
a lawyer), he met the person who was to be the m::>St important 
influence of his political and ideological life: the great humanist, 
Socialist leader, Jean Jaur~s. 9 
In his Nouvelles Conversations de Goethe avec Eckermann (1897), 
Blum characterized Goethe's "second Faust" as a Socialist agitator, in 
the manner of Jaure~: 
I gave Faust eloquence, radiance, that magnetic 
power that, in a crowd, everyone believes, and 
despite oneself, in his force, sincerity and 
goodness. I made him energetic and candid. He is 
an optimist; he believes that man is just, that 
only poverty and advanced civilization led him 
astray and corrupted him. To conquer, he only 
appealfoto the most elevated sentiments of the 
heart. 
The twenty-three-year-old Blum seemed to be the Eighteenth 
century man of reason and objectivity, looking up to the elite limen of 
the race of Herder ."11 Born in a middle class background, his social 
consciousness was sparked more by the philosophes than by poverty, 
though he grew up on the bustling and strongly Republican ' rue 
Saint-Denis in paris. 12 Yet his Socialist vision was essentially quite. 
simple: "true equality lies in the exact connection between each 
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indi vidual and his abili ties , " regardless of weal th and social 
order. 13 Blum linked democracy and Socialism all his life. He used 
/ 
the same phrases in ~ l'echelle humaine over forty years later; in the 
"democracy of tomorrav" all jobs are "equally noble, since all are 
equally useful.,,14 
Ironically the danger, the Achilles' heal, of Blum's Faust, was 
a shrewd inventor who knew that "in our society, science creates 
unemployment." A new invention leads to workers ' riots, induced by 
Mephistopheles, and the bourgeois parliament refuses to listen to 
Faust ' s proposals. Yet Faust accepts his lot and never trades his 
noble suffering in the name of a just and more egalitarian future 
society. 15 "Goethe" believed that Faust would ultimately succeed. 
Almost the same happened to Blum in power. 
In Blum's (or "Goethe's") evaluation of the controversial leader 
Bismarck, we again see the admiration of the "man of the race of 
Herder" maintaining personal integrity. But this integrity is in the 
context of Bismarck's pragmatism in a changing world, not vis-a-vis 
Socialist principles. 
He was a man free of prejudices and resentments, 
who was never limi ted by dogmas, who always 
penetrated things with direct, impartial, and 
practical vision, but who nevertheless remained 
human. He was a man of peace, having retarded war 
for twenty years, and having reduced bloodshed to 
the minimum. He was rroderate in victory. The 
evolution of his will was admirable in its constant 
correspondence to the movement of life. No one 
surrendered more piously than this brutal rnasterl~f 
history to reality and its necessities and laws. 
Could the simultaneous admiration for a Jaures and a Bismarck 
shed light on Blum's behavior as a Premier and Socialist in 1936? 
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"-Both Jaures and Bismarck, in Blum's estimation, retained a certain 
core, a certain personal belief in humanity and peace , despite the 
fact that one was principled and the other pragmatic. To understand 
this is to understand what confuses many historians: why Blum was 
convinced that he could deal with Hitler and Mussolini by "challenging 
their honor(!)" with the nonintervention pact.l7 First, he certainly 
had no illusions about Nazi Germany, but he did know its leader had to 
be somehow accountable to his people. Jaur~s had written 
There was never a democracy, however pacifist, that 
could form if it did not guaranty national 
independence. There was never a nation, however 
mdlitaristic, that could constitute or save itself 
if it did not appeal in sara measure to the 
revolutionary forces of liberty. 
In the same way, Blum addressed the men of of the Vichy regime, who 
accused him of "dreams" 'of disarmament, that no people, "even in the 
totalitarian regimes, would fight unless they were assured all had 
already been attempted to preserve peace." The advantage of rallying 
the people was greater in a democracy, since the people had a stake in 
the regime. In 1936, new military credits had passed "unanimously"; 
thus for Blum, the French Republican and Socialist principle of a 
"nation united" was the only legitimate way to combat the Hitlerian 
menace. 19 
Secondly, Blum had faith in" collecti ve secur i ty" as a moral 
force of nations united against Germany through the arbitration of a 
League of Nations. His remonstrations against the Hoare-Laval 
agreement in December 1935 demonstrated that peace for him could not 
be guaranteed any other way; justice among nations should be as 
justice among individuals. 
Peace is only possible on a basis of equality of 
rights and justice among nations, on the basis of 
arbitration and mutual assistance, on the basis of 
the magnificent concept that the ag~oessor against 
one nation becomes the enemy of all. 
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And what if justice among nations did not, in reality, reflect the 
laws of civil justice? Blum never fully explained. In this sense he 
shared in the moral despair and disillusionment of the interwar years. 
Unfortunately, the morality and respect between enemies on paper in 
pre-World War I Europe, as the film Le Grand Illusion despaired, was 
no longer a widely held value b¥ 1936. 
Blum's belief in socialism as a moral force, "almost as a 
religion, ,,21 comes from his Jewishness and from Jau;es. The Jewish 
Messiah is Justice, Blum wrote in the Nouvelles Conversations. Unlike 
Christians who hope in the next world, Jews are concerned with this 
world, with giving "each his due." "Is that not the spirit of 
Socialism?" He adds, "The Bible says: a just person - when the 
, , ,,22 " , al' al · Evangel1st says: a SaInt. To Jaures, SOCI Ism was so more than 
an economic doctrine, in the same way that the "patrie" was more than 
an economic entity, as Marxists conceived it; it was God that guided 
f 'd" 23 h h Joan 0 Arc, not econOIDlC etermlnlsm. In t e s ame way, t e French 
Revolution of 1789 was more than the drive for property. The workers 
rioting in the faubourgs of Paris knew very well they were not each 
fighting for a piece of land. What the Revolution gave them was "the 
conscience of their dignity and their strength, and of the vast 
possibilities of action that would result, in a full democracy, from 
their proud work. " They knew their action, continued " Jaures, would 
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have an effect for the future, and they rejoiced in the present. 24 
Blum likewise invoked the Revolution in his appeal to the young people 
of France, To Be ~ Socialist. "Your salaries are never representative 
of the full value of your work." But during the Revolution, the 
special privileges for the few had been abolished. 25 
In the early years of the Third Republic when Jaur~s wrote and 
when monarchism was still a strong political force, to be a republican 
was a faith, more than it is today. A Republic in France assured the 
workers a voice, a way to "conquer" power, to achieve liberty and 
digni ty , as well as "economic harmony. ,,26 Thus for Jaures, 
republicanism was the opposite side of the Socialist coin. Jaur~s's 
innovation was to humanize the "patrie", which held the "roots of 
human existence.,,27 
In addition, Jaur~s gave Republican France a mission: 
The only social role that France can fulfill in the 
world, the only one that can give its actions 
universal value and exalt the souls of the French 
with a superior emotion, where the life of France 
and the life of humanity vibrate, is to aid, in 
France, by all the strength of re~aican 
democracy, the advent of labor over property. 
"-Jaures criticized the ambiguous phrase "the workers have no homeland. " 
In France in the late Nineteenth - early Twentieth Centuries, the 
working classes were kept outside the social order, were not part of 
the definition of the "state." The Corrmune of 1870 was the most 
serious and bloody protest in France against this situation. 
Therefore to affirm that the proletariat had no homeland at that time 
was to actually negate the gains of the French revolution, to 
"paralyze" the working class am democracy, am to protect the 
bourgeoisie. He quoted Marx: 
Without doubt the proletariat must first conquer 
political power, rise up as a national sovereign 
class and constitute itelf as a nation; in this 
sense it is still attached to a 2~tionali ty. But 
no longer in the bourgeois sense. 
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How does the proletariat constitute itself as a nation, if the 
proletariat does not even have a voice within the state? Marx's 
revolution was evolutionary, Jaur~s concluded. one could easily 
substi tute "the bourgeoisie had no homeland" if the subject were 
France before 1789. Therefore the Revolution of Europe would not 
immediately be a comnunist one, but a deTClC:Cratic and bourgeois 
revolution that would rid Europe of feudalism and pave the way for the 
proletarian conquest of power. 30 
" Jaures also saw no contradiction between proletarian socialists 
and internationalists in the organization of national defense. "War 
aoove all renders impossible regular social evolution. ,,31 But to rid 
all military castes and financial circles from all nations, enhancing 
democracy within a country, is to serve not only the International and 
the universal proletariat, but the patrie itself. 
It is in the International that the independence of 
nations finds its highest guarantee; it is in the 
independent nations that the internat~2nal has its 
most powerful and noble organization. 
An army, then, must emerge fran the people as a whole, "the nation 
armed," rather than a military elite, whose corruption in France the 
Dreyfus Affair had uncovered. Jaur~s wrote a voluminous and detailed 
study on The New ~. 
Central to this study of Blum's principles and whether his 
application of Jaur~s in the 1930s was anachronistic is the question: 
28 
was there anything in Jaures ' s opinion that would allow France to 
intervene in the affairs of another state? J \. . aures viewed the 
rapprochement in 1903 between France and England, along with France's 
treaties with Russia and Italy, as "liberating," leading to 
federations in the future. 33 However, alliances of two powers against 
t\~ others threaten war. For example, Jaur~, in a news article, 
noted the potential danger of the conflicting allegiances of France 
and England during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, the first with 
Russia, and the second with Japan.34 However it is difficult to find 
any situation in Jaures's time comparable to the dilemma Blum faced of 
whether or not to support the Spanish government. The conflict 
between imperialisms of 1914 differed fram the unilateral threat of 
Nazism. 
The civil war in Morocco was perhaps the closest parallel in 
Jaures ' s time to the Spanish Civil War. In 1903, a revolt in Morocco 
and a raid by Moroccan Berbers on French troops patrolling the 
Algerian frontier gave France the occasion for intervention. Jaures, 
who never requested independence for a single French colony,35 reacted 
by saying France had "interests of the highest order" in Morocco. 36 
However, he denOunced military intervention. By undertaking a 
military expedition, France \o.Ould surrender her "role as mediator in 
maintaining peace in the \o.Orld." He explained that since the Moslem 
nations acted as a bloc, France's "moral and economic action" in 
Morocco would bias the neighboring nations in favor of France _ . what 
he called "pacific penetration." The Moroccans would reciprocate the 
friendly trade offers b¥ extending French influence . 
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In 1905, France sent an expedition against raids in Morooco. A 
while later, the visit of the Kaiser to Tangier threatened a war 
between France and Germany. "-Jaures accused the Delcasse government of 
having antagonized the German government, although he did not excuse 
German militarism. France should negotiate a settlement with Germany 
like that arranged with England. 
Patriotism demands that diplomacy remove every 
equivocation and pr3lJent, by frank explanation, all 
possible conflicts. 
He concluded that opposition to intervention should be put forth by 
both countr ies, and welccmed the other European fX)Wers as well to 
contribute to a conference on the "International Organization of 
control. and guarantee.,,38 
If such cooperation did not occur, Jaures nonetheless considered 
France's security against an aggressive Germany most crucial. Jaures 
fought for peace, but he also preached a concrete form of patr iotism 
based on the resolution to defend France against attack; to ensure her 
security by means of a national rrdlitia and the Triple Entente; to 
restore the lost provinces; to further France's prestige in China, 
Morocco, and the Near East. 39 
Jaures was assassinated on the eve of World War I, just as he 
was appealing for peace and mediation when the crisis in the Balkans 
erupted. "What ~uld he have done had he been among us? What ~uld 
he have been during the war?," Blum asked in a lecture on July 31, 
1917, the third anniversary of Jaures's death. He answered with 
assurance: 
About his attitude in the beginning, the days 
following the assassination, there is no possible 
doubt. He hated war. All of his activities for 
the preceding fifteen years had been directed 
toward preventing it ••• He would thus have carried 
out to the end the effort for peace. He would have 
needed to be oampletely sure that, on our side, 
everything that it was possible to do or to attempt 
to prevent universal catastrophe had really been 
done or attempted. Those who lived with him during 
the last days know how imperious, how troubling was 
this need of his conscience. But they also know 
that the need had been. satisfied. 
Confronted with certainty, with the irreparable, he 
would not have doubted for a single instant that 
war had been unleashed b¥ others, and that the 
German government was indeed a criminal government 
that had to be overthrown by war, fran the mcment 
that it was not overthrown b¥ the revolutionary 
struggle of the German proletariat... He would 
have done what we have all done. He would have 
cooperated in the ~tional defense ••• and would have 
becorne its leader. 
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Whether Jaur~s wo~d have decided to participate in the war 
effort or not, the Socialist Party in France was divided on the 
question of "class collaboration" • For many socialists in 1914, as 
for Blum, the hope for a lasting peace fell with the collapse of the 
German proletariat. Most French Socialists responded as citizens of 
a nation under attack. Others clamored "revanche" for 
Alsace-Lorraine. Still others thought the war would finally end 
bourgeois rule. Blum served as chef de cabinet under two Socialist ----
leaders in the ·government. The "sacred union" began to fall apart by 
1916, when France was losing badly and when revolution was threatening 
in tsarist Russia. But Blum was convinced of the oampatibility of 
patriotism and socialism. 4l 
To Blum World War I demonstrated how fragile even so sizable a 
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German Socialist Party was, if "it did not rest on political liberty, 
on a republican regime" like France. 42 Blum's militancy at this time 
is striking; it was not the conciliarism of a later time, Lacouture 
argues. 43 Blum described his interpretation of Jaures further: 
He knew that in today's capitalist 
regime ••• social revolution can never be conceived 
in an isolated nation ••• and when other nations are 
not won over by propaganda... The French 
Revolution itself only succeeded because of the 
democratic sympathy of peoples on which Jaures 
insisted with force and novelty, and which 
proceeded from the European fOC)vernent of ideas in 
the Eighteenth Century. 
Jaures would never have doubted that the war posed 
a crisis of conscience before humanity -- the same 
as Tolstoy noted in the Dreyfus Affair -- and that 
if a crisis was resolved by a German victory, we 
would only find wasted g~ beings with which to 
build the future society. 
We need the "sacred union, n said Blum; if only Jaur~s were still 
alive, he would have lifted the Party's morale , he would have "shown 
us the true reasons... the just reasons for war . " The "just reasons 
for war" were to combat "industrial caesarisrn" in order to assure 
Socialism for tomorrow. 
Blum emerged from the war a strong advocate of party unity and 
became its leader, "the inventor of a elusive Socialist center.,,45 At 
the time he wrote To Be ~ Socialist, he spoke eloquently on the 
"vectorial sum" of Socialist ideas in flux. 
The party is continually changing and evolving 
between two options, two fixed poles: one is the 
future society which we foresee, which we predict, 
which we bring into being; the other is the present 
soc~ety ~6omwhose womb we wish to draw that future 
SOCIety. 
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As the 1920s unfolded, the Socialist Party divided on the issue of 
whether to participate in the government, the old issue of labor 
reform through existing institutions or outright revolution. The 
French Communist Party was formed in December 1920 at the Socialist 
Congress of Tours, choosing to follow the direction of Moscow. 
Addressing the Congress, Blum demonstrated his adherence to the 
concept of the revolution in the transition from Marx to Jaures. 
Granted, he began, the reformists are wrong in assuming the social 
transformation could arise without a political crisis. But there is 
another error, and that "consists in thinking that the conquest of 
poli tical power is an end in itself, while it is only a means, " a 
means to the final transformation of the economic system, against 
bourgeois power. 47 
By 1926, Blum further developed what Henry Kissinger would call 
fifty years later a "conceptual breakthrough" by establishing the 
famous distinction between the "conquest" and the uexerciseu of 
power. 48 Blum proposed a third solution to the Socialist dilemma of 
participation in a bourgeois government. Before the revolution, the 
Socialist party should only enter government insofar as it would have 
control over the situation. Blum admitted that proceeding within the 
legal parliamentary and democratic procedures "is and always will be a 
particularly difficult and painful task for socialist parties" in that 
the masses would be still nore impatient for bold action. However, a 
government under socialist leadership would act "with energy, 
resolution, and decisiveness that would not (allow) it to be stopped 
by the obstacles that other governments find insurmountable.,,49 The 
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essence of "Blumism, " to Lacouture, is summed up in the following 
letter to Maurice Sarraut in 1926. Sarraut had accused the Socialist 
Party of having contributed to the downfall of the Cartel des gauches, 
in refusing to participate in the government: 
Because, in our eyes, revolutionary transfo~ation 
presupposes a period of preparatory work, which 
will have sufficiently penetrated, molded, and 
adapted capitalist society, and will have insured 
the adequate development of socialist realities and 
socialist ideas; because we know that this 
preparatory work is dependent domestically on the 
protection and extension of political freedom and 
externally on peace, we can support the Radical 
program in these three areas: political freedom, 
peace, and social reforms. We cannot support it as 
useful and beneficial in itself; we can support it 
only as contr ibuting to our a.mefforts. In this 
sense, according to the now classic expression, we 
and the Radicals can "go part of the way together." 
If the Radical Party vigorously undertakes the 
action that corresponds to its role, it will remain 
possible to find a sufficient number of common 
objectives for our concerted energies. For the 
Radicals, this will be the end and the gogO; for 
us, it will be the beginning and the means. 
Therefore, from 1921 to 1933, as party leader and deputy in the 
Chamber, Blum developed his a.m doctr ine of Socialism in government, 
a::mbining ." Jaures's ideal of patriotism with the revolutionary 
transformation of society that did not happen after the War. Although 
Blum was insulted and attacked fram all sides he nevertheless strongly 
voiced a consistent stance on many domestic and foreign policy issues. 
He courageously protested the chauvinism on both sides of the Rhine 
while the occupation of the Ruhr was taking place. In a speech at the· 
Hamburg Socialist Congress in 1923, Blum received "thunderous 
awlause" for his boldness in attacking both the French and German 
governments, as well as for his Jaur~ian remarks. The coupling of 
patriotism and internationalism was defined as 
the conviction, which is continually confirmed by 
experience, that in the current state of the world 
economy there can be no contradiction between the 
real, long-range interests of one pacific nation 
and theSlreal, long-range interests of' all the 
others. 
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Greatly moved, the president of the session, a former supporter of 
"sacred union" on the German side, praised Bhnn's courageous speech, a 
reminder of 
,-
"Jaures ••• filled with the purest spirit of 
internationalisrn."S2 
Hitler's oomdng to power in 1933 and the rise of fascist parties 
in Europe along with economic crisis were key turning points in the .. 
future direction of the Socialist platform in France. Jaures wrote in 
a time when democracy was on the rise in Europe, and organized labor 
was beginning to be heard, as well as when nationalist movements began 
to grON more influential. The Second International of 1905 condemned 
capi talist war. But after 1918, the trend was reversed. Fascist 
states rose while the democracies faltered. After the sacred union 
came the realization that the war did not lead to the downfall of 
Europe's bourgeoisie but in fact created a class of nouveaux riches. 
Socialists on the right like Renaudel began to advocate joining 
the newly re-formed Radical government and "defend democracy" rather 
than oppose the capitalist regime. Blum agreed that "national defense 
is conceivable in a capitalist regime." But he added right away that 
lito go back on our traditional or:position to military budgets would 
deal a ser ious blON to peace." Such a sudden reversal would lead 
Europe to dangerous deductions and would foster the "psychosis of 
war .IIS3 At close examination, Blum was not contradicting his aNn past 
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support of the "sacred union." His opposition to military budgets carne 
at a time when he protested the unrealistic French expectations of 
reparations from Germany, and when disarmament talks were in progress. 
Other socialists to the right, disdainfully called "neos" by 
Blum, Paul Faure and the other party leaders, correctly diagnosed the 
mystique of fascism to the lower middle classes, but their cure was by 
innoculation of the disease. They cr ied for "Order, Author i ty , 
Nation," not social democracy. 54, Meanwhile the Center and Left of the 
Party reinforced its hard line against participation and rearmament. 
HeM .. did the threat of a rival ideology of the right, in the 
French Socialist debate, affect Blum's perspective on the nature of 
socialist "exercise of power," if at all? Up until now, we have seen 
him comfortably uniting, patiotism with social revolution and 
internationalism. France had a positive "mission" to change its own 
economic and social structure and to "arbi trate" among the other 
nations. But did Blum have to change his ideas after Hitler? Of 
crucial importance, was there anything in Blum's thought between 1933 
and 1936 that would presage his reaction to Spain when he and the 
Popular Front took power? In other words, is it legitimate to argue 
that Blum's ideology was too unrealistic and the man too unequipped to 
deal with a Hitler or a Mussolini or a Franco, to maintain peace? If 
so, why? Or must we look elsewhere to the context of the time, of the 
cultural and social, political and economic trends of the 1930s, for 
the key to Blum's behavior? 
According to historian Marcus, French socialists replaced their 
"messianic zeal" for a better, classless society, with a destructive 
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to the Party - anti -fascist mystique, a sort of" fai th by 
negation." "It produced," he wrote, "a fatal indecision over what the 
Socialist could do to meet it. ,,55 
I would argue that Blum was one of the notable exceptions who 
recognized that the appeal of fascism was above traditional Marxist 
economic explanations for any phenomenon. He was less naive than the 
standard historical interpretation of him. Yet though I would agree 
with Lacouture and Droz that Blum was often unable to draw the 
conclusions his perceptivity would imply, the accusation of naivete 
ignores the very limited extent to which Blum was to "exercise power" 
in the coalition. The interplay of the Socialist factions during this 
time also limited his alternatives. 
For example, Blum's . views on disarmament were central to Blum's 
strategy between 1930 and 1935. Yet he did rearm France when he 
became Premier. Why? Because he saw that Europe was in fact 
threatened, and that collective security was the only solution and 
"collective securitu only rests on the force of arms. ,,56 But Blum 
never gave up the hope for disarmament, and even held discussions with 
a representative of Hitler in 1936 to discuss the possibility of arms 
control. His account of this meeting, before the judges at Riom, is 
one the most moving of his career: 
I could have told (Dr. Schacht) , if I was the man 
you depict: "I am a Marxist, I am a Jew, I do not 
enter into talks with a State which has extirpated 
all the SOCialist organizations and where Jews are 
persecuted." If I had said that, I would have 
betrayed the charges of my office. But I told him: 
"I am a Marxist, I am a Je!Ii, and it is because of 
this that I truly desire to follow through our 
conversation." He answered me: Monsieur, that gives 
you all the greater honor." I did not ask that 
compliment of him, but I took advantage of it to 
show him that when dealing with questions of 
disarmament, whether in Geneva, or Paris or 
elsewhere, I did so with the interests of the 
country in mind. At the same time, I rearmed as no 
other person had done. In one case after another, 
I fulfilled the duties of my charge, my duty as 




This shows of what Leon Blum was made. He achieved honor as a 
French nationalist. He suffered like his Faust, was principled, 
humanitarian, and hopeful like Jaures, and pragmatic like that other 
statesman he admired fran his youth, Bismarck. If Blum did not see 
the necessity of rearmament until 1936 "he cannot be faulted," as 
Lacouture writes, for having denounced the chauvinism of Generals 
Weygand and p~tain who "enclosed the French army in the most routine 
atdication of intelligence." Also, a man whose strategic realism and 
authority are more acknowledged than those of Blum, Franklin 
Roosevelt, revived disarmament negotiations with MacDonald and Herriot 
as late as 1937. And a man who left the SFIO in 1931 to be better 
able to devote himself to the national defense, Paul-Boncour, still 
made disarmament part of his "constructive plan" of 1932. 58 
In Spain, Blum could have intellectually justified either 
intervention or nonintervention. He could have justified intervention 
in the Jaur~sian messianic sense -- in fact Blum preferred the word 
"interference" at the time. Colton says Blum's faith that "the 
dictators would honor their signatures revealed one of his major 
weaknesses. ,,59 But is there ever a time when a hurnani tar ian is out of 
place in government? Yes, but only when the humanitarian must 
confront others not as moral as him or herself. It was not his ideas, 
or his personality that deserve the verdict of "guilty" in not aiding 
the Spanish Republic. Blum was part of a time and place, in a 
democratic society. In the following chapters we will examine the 
dynamic forces of France at the time of the Spanish appeal. 
0IAPl'ER 3 
French Public Opinion 
I was not a king in France. It was bnpossible for 
me to envisage war without the consent of 
Parliament and without the consent of public 
opinion. 
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Some historians and contemporaries of the tumultuous 1930s, 
including Blum himself, have maintained that had France intervened in 
Spain, Civil War would have exploded in France herself. Was this in 
fact true? If not, what led Blum to believe it was? Did membership 
in a particular social class affect involvement and interest in 
foreign affairs? In other words, were same sections of public opinion 
more powerful than others? 
France during the 1930s was suffering from a "crise de 
valeurs. ,,2 The French realized that it would be bnpossible to return 
to the Belle Epoque of pre-war days. The economic crisis served to 
contradict the maxbn that a better standard of living comes from hard 
work. 3 As a result of the First World War, France became a debtor 
nation, and inflation and high prices marked the twenties. Since 
there was no international system to regulate floating debts, the 
currency values of France, Britain, and the u.S. were disproportional, 
leading to -- at least for the French -- unsynchronized devaluations. 
In 1928, the Poincare government stabilized the franc, to 1914 levels, 
but it was too high with respect to the dollar and pound, and since 
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French goods became expensive, unemployment rose (albeit not as badly 
as in the Anglo powers). France was in a depression by 1933. 
In addition from 1924 to 1934, several French governments 
fell--with the same men oondng to power every time--while the fascist 
regimes in Germany and Italy appeared stable. The peace established 
by the Treaty of Versailles seemed woefully fragile. And the French 
still suffered psychologically from the war and the loss of its youth. 
The low morale finally exploded in the riots of the 6 of 
February 1934 in Paris, where Rightists, groups of war veterans, and 
some Cbrnmunists violently protested against the Radical Socialist 
government. Marc Rucart, in his report on those protests in Paris , 
well summed up the prevailing pessimism of the day: 
How can one believe in truth, beauty, goodness, 
under the regime of lies and hate, under this 
spectacle of hideous bloodshed? How can one truly 
believe !n "imminent justice" when iniquity 
dominates? 
But who were these weary people? What, secondly, did the advent 
of the Popular Front mean to them? What action did each group propose 
for France in Spain, and how far did each group go -- or could have 
gone -- to support. it? 
We will start with the "petty bourgeoisie, " considered the base 
of French society. These were primarily small shopkeepers, artisans, 
white-collar workers, provincial lawyers, and teachers. 5 The interwar 
reconstruction created some nouveaux ' riches. Large and small 
enterprises benefitted from foreign capital and inflation in France. 
The petty bourgeoisie was the one group that was not severely hurt by 
the Depression, since it did not borrow or invest on the same large 
scale as big business. But it was only a matter of time before it was 
affected as production fell and unemployment rose. Even civil 
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servants were hurt ~ government solutions to tax them. "One result 
of the prolonged Depression," writes the historian Nathanael Greene 
"was the radicalization of ~rkers and peasants, and the hostility of 
small businessmen, hit hard by the Depression, to their demands.,,6 
The SFIO was composed prilnarily of workers, same peasants and 
artisans, intellectuals, white collar ~rkers and civil servants, 
small-town teachers and lawyers. 7 Its members tended to be from urban 
areas. However, it was the party of the rural petty bourgeoisie and 
the middle-of-the-road liberals, the Radical Party, that both the 
Communist and the Socialist Parties knew they had to capture. The 
rndddle classes traditionally believed the government must protect and 
defend their established interests rather than promote innovation. a 
This made them key targets of the fascist parties. 
FranfDis Goguel points out the correlation between the level of 
industrialization in particular regions of France and party 
affiliation. There is no direct correlation of peasant/conservative 
• am worker/radical. However, he writes, while such heavily 
agricultural sectors, as northwest France, or the Vendee, Mandre, 
Mayenne and Morbihan departments usually did vote Right, in other 
agricultural areas 
,A I 
such as Creuse, Correze, Drome, and the Eastern 
Pyrenees (the center to southeast France), the vote was Extreme Left. 9 
And among industrial regions, the Paris region and northern 
France, heavily industrial, voted Left, but other heavily industrial 
sectors voted Right, such as the Somme and Oise in the northeast, and 
h ' t nlf' d La' , 10 C t" ' 1" 1 t e unportan .nuone an lre reglons. er aln po 1 tlca 
proclivities seem to cut across regional lines. catholic France, for 
example, voted traditionally to the Right despite social class. ll 
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How does one explain the true "class character" of France, where 
the teachers were more revolutionary than the "proletarian" metal 
workers' union?12 Goguel's electoral geography could still provide an 
explanation. He differentiated between "static" and "dynamic" France. 
In static France, increases in productivity were below the national 
average and its economic structure and ideologies retained the 
tradtional liberalism of the Nineteenth Century. In these regions, 
"Socialism meant primarily a political concept, a modern-dress version 
of republican principles and an expression of sinistrisme.,,13 In 
dynamic France, where industrial production was above average, such as 
in the northeast and Paris, scx:::ial mobility was greater and this 
instability, especially during the Depression, may have contributed to 
the radicalization of the workers. 14 The demands of the First WOrld 
War altered the economic geography of the country, with a continual 
influx of workers to the new industrial centers from rural areas. IS 
All of this implies that static France supported an alliance 
with the political party which traditionally glorified individualism, 
smallness and the family firm, while the federations of dynamic France 
demanded a strict class alignment against middle-class civilization 
"and its natural, if monstrous, offspring, fascism. ,,16 
Blum once asked himself how the riots of February 6, 1934 
against the French Republic "could have failed; logically they should 
have succeeded. ,,17 The Left succeeded, partly due to the rhetoric of a 
united "defensive" front against fascism, and to the Conmunist 
turn-around and overture to the Socialists on the one hand, and to the 
petty bourgeoisie on the other. The extreme left began to capture 
those regions steadfastly republican as well as "dynamic".18 The 
Depression had politically radicalized both the workers and the 
43 
peasantry. Masses of French workers went on strike on February 12, 
1934 with one million in Paris alone. 19 Another reason for the failure 
of the February 6 riots lay in the stability of France's democratic 
tradition. French conservatives -- at least until 1940 -- maintained 
their allegiance to the Republic. Unlike Italy and Germany, Greene 
adds, "France had built-in safeguards against fascism in her tightly 
structured society, the traditions of the family and individualism, 
and the bourgeois beliefs that buttressed the "stalemated" society.,,20 
The alliance of the middle classes and the workers brought the 
Popular Front to power, but the Spanish Civil War divided them 
,21 d' 'anall agaIn. Tra It 1 y, France had been much more concerned with 
danestic than foreign politics. "While Parliament could embarrass a 
government, either in conmittee or in open session, very, very rarely 
was it prepared to seize on a foreign issue for the purpose of 
toppling a rninistry.,,22 The order of interest in politics had been, in 
declining order of importance, municipal, regional, national, and 
finally international. This attitude explains why less than one 
percent of all parliamentary questions were addressed to foreign 
affairs, or why there was never a single debate on the question of 
France's role in the Councilor the Assembly of the League of 
Nations. 23 
But "it would be 00 exaggeration" to say that by the end of the 
summer in 1936, foreign affairs became the citizen's main concern. 24 
The French workers were naturally the most solid supporters of the 
Spanish government and L~n Jouhaux, head of the ror, was one of many 
labor leaders to urge "all democratic states, conforming to 
International Law" to supply the legal Spanish government "the means 
necessary for her defense." 25 Each late July and August day, Le 
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Populaire listed unions supporting Spain. Left-wing papers such as Le 
Populaire, Le Peuple (of the <Dr) and L'Humanitt denounced the 
nonintervention proposal. In Saint-Clooo on August 8, after the 
pro!X>Sal was announced, Blum was greeted with cries of "Guns and 
planes for Spain!,,26 
On September 5, Blum received a delegation of metal workers who, 
claiming to support Spain, warned him that they were preparing to call 
a one-hour strike two days later, to pressure the government to change 
its policy to more effective aid for Spain. Blum dismissed them, 
seemingly out of character for him, answering that a strike would not 
change the policy adopted in the general interest. Yet Blum was 
nervous. 27 He learned the Seine Socialist Federation was to call a 
meeting on aid to Spain iI,1 Luna-Park and, although not invited, he 
decided to attend. That day also ooincided with the fall of Irun to 
Franoo, further exciting public opinion. Blum's clear speech and air 
of authority transformed the cries of "Blum to action!" to "Vive 
Blum! ,,28 "I understand you," he said, but he added France cannot risk 
international war, and oould not renege on an agreement signed by 
other powers. Few in the crowd oontinued to question Blum's sincerity 
and Jrotivations for his policy.29 
The Right, however, was much Jrore vocal and united in its 
attacks on the Popular Front sympathy with Spain. Blum himself 
identified the Right with the "bourgeoisie": local assemblies, civil 
servants, certain newspapers, finance, and above all, the Senate.30 
The curious paradox of the Right is that while its members proclaimed 
themselves to be the true llnationalists," their hatred of carmunism 
and fear of revolution, led them to take sides with the authoritarian 
states. 31 They had genuinely feared the strikes that had intensified 
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with the advent of the Popular Front. Intellectuals on the Right, 
such as Pierre Drieu La Rochelle and Pierre Gaxotte, discussed the 
danger of a Bolshevized Spain. The latter panicked: "French 
intervention in the Spanish Civil War would be the beginning of the 
European conflagration wanted by Mos<XM. ,,32 Those who advocated the 
harshest measures against Germany after World War I now became her 
supporters. "Better Hi tIer than Blum" was one slogan of the . day. 
But the point is to ask: Why did Blum listen to the Right, 
which was in the minority in the French Government in 1936? 
For one, the rightist press was in fact an actor in the affair . 
It was through the Echo de Paris that, as early as July 22, the news 
of the Spanish goverrunent's telegram was revealed, as well as, and 
rrore importantly, how many arms and planes were sent. 33 Henri de 
K~rillis of L'Echo was the first to tell Blum, when Blum was in 
England on the 24th, that the sale of arms was "not well seen" back 
home. 34 A confidential memo on July 25 from France's ambassador in 
Berlin revealed that Germany paid close attention to articles in the 
.-/ 
Liberte, the Echo de Par is, Le Jour, "etc. " These articles had 
"insinuated the Quai d'Orsay was in disagreement" with Blum. 35 Could 
these papers have tried to provoke dissension within the cabinet, or 
at least to exploit the differences? 
Blum's son, Robert, who was close to his father during the 
entire affair, maintained that Blum was firmly resolved to aid Spain. 
Yet he knew he would have to proceed in secret, so as not to rupture 
the Rassernblernent Populaire. But once the center and rightist papers 
publicized the issue, "certain Radical leaders let Blum know their 
(the papers') opinion. ,,36 
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Protest in the rightist press was the bnmediate cause of the 
cabinet's reconsideration of selling arms to Spain on July 25. The 
Action Francaise led an active campaign to mobilize national opinion. 
J 
Charivari, who closely collaborated with L'Action, reported: 
It must be said because it is the truth: a French 
newspaperman has this week rendered a signal 
service to his country: Maurice Pujo. It was Pujo 
who first, with proofs and detail in support, 
denounced the odious deal ••• It was Pujo who first 
put a stop to execution of the bargain, who 
provoked the intervention of M. Henri Berenger (a 
Senator)... and the37pecial cabinet announcement of Saturday afternoon. 
Delbos himself indirectly corroborated the connection between the 
rightist press and the cabinet's decision. He informed all French 
Ambassadors that rep::>rts of France "lending its support to the Spanish 
government to canbat the insurgents" were inaccurate. Delivery of war 
materiel to Spain (not unarmed planes) was forbidden, and reminded the 
Ambassadors that France did not intervene in the affairs of other 
nations. 38 
Another undercurrent in Blum's struggle with the right on the 
Spanish Civil War, was anti-semitism. Anti-semitism, a principle 
element of division in France since the Dreyfus Affair, was revived 
wi th the influx of refugees in France fran Central Europe.39 On 
February 6, 1934 cries of "France for the French" rang out along with 
anti-oommunist slogans. 40 Many journalists did not hesitate to 
associate Franco with the Church against Bolshevism. 41 Not only did 
Blum have to defend his patriotism as a socialist, but also as a Jew. 
Between the Left agitating against concessions to the fascists, 
domestic and international, and the Right, accusing the "unassimilable 
Jew" of warmongering, Blum asserted in Luna Park: 
I am a Frenchman -:- since I am French - prom of 
his country, proud of her history, nourished as 
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much as possible, despite my race, on her tradition 
(Applause) ••• I will neglect nothing to assure the 
security of her defense ••• But, when we speak of 
national dignity ••• one of the necessary elements of 
nati~nal 4~nor is the will for peace (prolonged 
ovation). 
(Of the II since I am French, II Henr i B~r and in the fascist newspaper 
Gringoire wrote sarcastically, lilt is too beautiful, too beautifuL •• 
Neither Sully, nor Richelieu, nor Danton, nor Carnot, nor Clemenceau, 
nor Poincare, judged it necessary to produce their birth certificates. 
No one asked them where they came from, granted II ) • 43 
The Right took advantage of the Spanish Civil War to exploit its 
ongoing opposition to the Popular Front experiment. It accused the 
government of provoking war at home and abroad. 44 Self-defense groups 
formed that July, including the "cagoulards", a domestic spy network. 
(Their false accusations in November 1936 of the Minister of the 
Interior of desertion during World War I led to his suicide). Those 
on the Left were more divided and confused. As Oreste Rosenfeld 
perceptively noted in Le populaire, August 10, 1936, on the Left 
riots, "Peace ••• and planes! That combination is tragic... But who is 
at fault?"45 
Public opinion "quickly and fiercely mobilized" in France for 
each of the camps fighting in spain;46 the Left remembered 1934 and 
feared new fascist riots while the Right feared the "red peril". 
Blum's fear that the threat of civil war was not totally illusory.47 
In a letter to the sister of a colleague, he later wrote: 
If these possibilities had became real 
(intervention and its consequences), civil· war in 
France would have preceded international war. The 
Spanish affair took place between the 6th of 
February and the armistice. It was intertwined 
with the social crisis. As soon as the situation 
had become dangerously tense, we would have had the 
equivalent of Franco's coup in France. Before any 
foreign war, France would have had civil war with 
little chance of victory for the Republic. That 
is, Spain would have been delivered. But Fran~ 
would have beoame Fascist, probably before Spain. 
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Although his analysis is perhaps over-dramatic, French history 
does present many examples of the danger in certain patterns of plass 
alliances: 
In the Year II , the foreign danger united bourgeois 
and sans-culotte because that danger was of 
aristocratic counter-revolution; in 1870, the 
French ruling classes did not have as serious a 
motive to resist Bismarck, and the patriotic and 
disinterested spirit of the popular masses in the 
ci ties did not find mor~9 than a mediocre echo in 
the French bourgeoisie. 
In his A l'Echelle Hurnaine, the culmination of his life's work, 
written in 1941 while lrnprisoned and awaiting trial by the Vichy 
regime, Leon Blum criticized the pcMer of the French bourgeoisie. "In 
fact, each time the will ' of the country manifests itself ~ universal 
suffrage, •• • the ruling bourgeoisie never lost a moment to eliminate it 
and reject it as a foreign body. "SO He may have had his frustrations 
on Spain in rrdnd, as well as other examples in French history, 
including Vichy. 
Yet to which French social group did Blum see himself 
responsible for once he took office? Was Blum, when he exercised 
power in the name of the left coalition, supposed to govern the rrdddle 
cl asses of France, the workers of the world, or the French? One of 
the ironies of democracy and "public opinion" is that "the good of the 
whole" requires the leader to make choices. Blum chose, in the case 
of Spain, not to appear to be embroiling France in a partisan conflict 
for partisan reasons; he chose nonintervention. George Orwell hit 
upon the humanitarian'S dilemma, a humanitarian who, when in pcMer, 
chooses for the whole to live, rather than to risk civil war: 
If the Spanish Civil War had been won, the cause of 
the common people everywhere would have been 
strengthened... that wa~lthe real issue; all else 
was froth on its surface. 
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Given Blum's beliefs that France ' s best interests required 
defense of the Republic, internal stability, and social reforms, and 
given the explosive nature of the Spanish Civil War issue for the 
French people, the Socialist Premier's commitment to nonintervention 
becomes clearer if not inevitable. 52 
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The Political Parties of the Popular Front Coalition 
Roughly, scholars divide into t\<,O camps when examining the 
origins of the French policy of nonintervention. The first (mostly 
British historians) emphasizes domestic politics, that Blum and Delbos 
found themselves llinited by a divided cabinet and country.l To the 
other school, which includes more left-wing historians and apologists, 
the British opposition to intervention was the decisive factor. 2 This 
chapter will concentrate on the first interpretation, best summarized 
by Young: 
To have pressed on with the original decision to 
aid the beleaguered Spanish government \<'ould have 
meant the strait-jacketing if not the fall of his 
administration. The Senate, without doubt, \<'ould 
have mounted a relentless opposition; and the 
wavering of many deputies, especially within the 
ranks of the Radical Socialists, \<'ould have 
imperiled the ~overnment even inside the newly 
elected Chamber. 
How bnportant were the internal pressures of Blum's cabinet and 
coalition politics? What were these pressures? Why did Blum listen? 
Could parliament effectively threaten the new social reforms? Could 
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it have caused the collapse of the Popular Front? What type of 
"uni ty" was important to Blun and why? 
The nature of the bond between the Socialists, Radicals, and the 
Conmunists was tenuous at best fran the time "unity of action" was 
declared after the February 6, 1934 riots. Because each party had a 
particular interest in forming the coalition, because the parliament 
was dOminated by the more moderate Radical Party and because 
intervention in the Spanish Civil War was a divisive issue for the 
Socialist Party itself, Blun exercised power within limits. 
The Communist Party initiated the Popular Front. 4 The 
Communists, ever since the schism at Tours in 1920, had consistently 
refused to associate with the bourgeois socialists, even on February 
6, 1934, and remained a small party. In the 1932 election , only 6. 78 % 
of the population voted Corrmunist. But by 1936, the party had changed 
its rhetoric to antifascism, and doubled its constituency, 
particularly among workers who were disenchanted with the Socialist 
Party's former dealings with the Radical Party in the 1920s. 5 
Suddenly, it seemed, the Communists went from a position of 
revolutionary defeatism, a stance against national defense under any 
circumstances, to patriotism. 6 According to the party, the 
international proletariat now demanded the defeat of Germany.7 
Why did the Communists change course? Firstly, the party was 
attuned to Moscow which feared the rearmament of fascist Germany; the 
threat to the USSR was more llnportant than class conflict. Secondly, 
some historians conjecture that Stalin wanted to prevent an alliance 
of Britain, France and Germany against an isolated USSR. The French 
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Communists could work against this possibility from within. And 
thirdly, as many in the 1930s suspected, in the event of a war of 
France and Great Britain against Germany, Stalin could come in and 
take over Europe.8 
The Franco-Soviet nonaggression treaty of May 1933, and the 
mutual assistance pact signed on May 3, 1935 by Foreign Minister Laval 
and Soviet Ambassador Potemkin explained the Communist Party's 
reversal on the French rearmament effort. 9 The Pact read: 
Stalin understands and fully approves the policy of 
national defense pursued by France in order to 
maintain its armra forces at a level consistent 
with its security. 
Some Socialists like Marx Dormoy, and Blum to some extent , were 
skeptical of a unity "desired by Moscow. "II However, Blum wrote in Le 
Populaire on July 14, 1934, a day before the -"unity of action" was 
announced, "I knew what the word "unity" meant for Jaures. A 
persistent and prudent will to maintain and tighten the unity of our 
Party, a persistent and bold will to direct the Party towards worker 
unity, that is how, in the)light of his memory, appears to me our 
duty.,,12 The two labor parties, the socialist ror and the Communist 
CGTU reunited in March 1936. 
However, in 1934 the Communist Party had less of an interest 
than the Socialist Party in structural reform of the economy since it 
wanted to gain the ~rtant backing of the Radical Party and the 
powerful bourgeois constituency it represented in the fight against 
fascism. 13 The Rassemblement Populaire program of January 11, 1936 was 
broad enough to attract all of France's Left. Although addressing 
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financial and social reforms, it was a defensive program against the 
fascist threat: to dissolve the paramilitary fascist leagues; to 
maintain international peace; to maintain democratic liberties; to 
investigate France's colonies. 14 Not until after the May 1936 election 
was it decided that the Socialist Party, and Leon Blum, would head the 
coaltion. 
The Communist Party did not participate in the Popular Front 
cabinet, and the ~lications were crucial to Blum's freedom of 
action, including the issue of Spain. It meant the balance in Blum's 
cabinet was more to the Radical right than it otherwise might have 
been. The Communist Party, according to its leader, Maurice Thorez, 
declined Blum's offer, because it was "convinced that the Comnunists 
will better serve the cause of the people by loyally supporting, 
unreservedly and without interruption, the government under Socialist 
leadership, rather than by offering, through their presence in the 
cabinet, a pretext for the enemies of the people to create panic. ,,15 
One French journalist in Moscow reported conversations he had had with 
Soviet civilian and military leaders on the Popular Front victory. 
His informants expected "a strong and united France determined to 
respond afPropriately to Hitler." For this reason, the Soviets 
declared themselves in favor of a postponement of revolution. The aim 
was a strong and stable France able to follow through on her pact with 
the Soviet Union.16 
The nonintervention policy sharply divided the antifascist 
coalition. Despite the USSR's favorable reception to the agreement, 
Thorez , for the Ccmnunists, demanded France send aid to the Spanish 
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workers. 17 The Soviet government feared a France isolated on three 
sides from her Eastern European allies, and when it saw to what extent 
Germany and Italy were violationg nonintervention, she began to send 
planes in October. The Soviet government announced "it could not 
consider itself bound by the agreement for nonintervention to any 
greater extent than any of the remaining participants. II Two months 
later the French Communists abstained for the first time, from voting 
on a motion of confidence related to the French government's foreign 
policy. However, the party still pledged its support to the Popular 
Front's other policies.18 
The Communist presence in the coalition was crucial insofar as 
it frightened the more conservative and propertied classes in France. 
Blum's second ministry fell within a month in March 1938, partly 
because he proposed to include Communists in his cabinet. 19 
The Communist presence was ~rtant in splitting labor; 
although the unions tried to steer clear from politics, they were 
predominantly Socialist and Communist. After the Communist Party 
withheld its vote of confidence for the Popular Front's policy on 
Spain, Blum and his colleagues considered resigning. But the Popular 
Front, Blum wrote: 
unanimously resolved to stay in pcMer. We decided 
that an open cr 1SlS in such conditions and at such 
a serious mcment would bind neither France nor 
other nations, that it would throw public opinion 
into trouble and confusion, that it would risk 
weakening the country and putting social reforms 
just passed into question. (He then reminded the 
Oammunist section of Parliament that) it is not 
only surmounting the difficulty of the hour, but of 
resolving it so that tomorrow, ~oaction can be 
pursued with confidence and loyalty. 
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But historian Annie Kriegel is critical of Blum's seeming 
abandonment of his socialism. In 1935, the French Communists had 
envisioned Popular Front comni ttees from below, analogous to the 
Russian soviets. Blum and the SFIO dismissed the idea and passed up 
the oPfXJrtuni ty to create a unique prole tar ian party, a "French 
Front", as Thorez proposed. 2l Nevertheless, the Communist Party's 
nonparticipation in the government, even though the Party 
proportionately received the greatest electoral gains in May 1936, and 
its oscillation between sUPfXJrt and admonition for the Popular Front, 
do not exonerate it. As Lacouture writes,' "the absence of the 
Communists constantly unbalanced the team and made the Radicals Blum's 
critics if not his jailers.,,22 
Blum's relations with the Radical Party were no less 
troublesome, and perhaps even more so, since his Minister of National 
Defense (Daladier) and his Minister of Foreign Affairs(Delbos), as well 
as the Vice Premier (Chautemps) and the Minister of the 
Navy (Gasnier-Duparc) and the Minister of Aviation(Cot), were all 
Radicals and held the highest posts in making foreign policy. The 
Radicals accepted the invitations of the Socialists and Communists 
less out of ideology than out of, as Greene surrmarizes, "electoral 
advantage, the opportunity to govern, the defense of the Republic, and 
the prospect of a number of reforms.,,23 
Most were not enthusiastic about the alliance, but they were 
well aware of the significance of their electoral weight, whether they 
swung to the Left or to the Right. Daladier took over the Party after 
Edouard Herriot and was affectionately known as the "bull of 
56 
Vaucluse,1I although he did not prove to be steadfast on February 6, 
1934, when he resigned less than a day after the rightist and 
carmunist demonstrations. But a new generation of IIYoung Radicals," 
Cot and Jean Zay (later Blum's minister of Education), emerged who 
II refused to condemn roth fascism and carmunism as equal threats." The 
Radicals, as in the past, were torn between their leftist impulses and 
their pocketbooks. 24 
One might ask, gi ven the decision of the Cornnunists not to 
participate in the cabinet, should Blum have proposed, for the sake of 
balance, that the Radicals likewise decline? Should Blum have formed 
a purely Socialist government, given that a cabinet without the 
Communists would not have represented a true tripartite coalition 
anyway? This was actua~ly proposed b¥ two left socialists a few days 
after the elections. Lacouture indicates, however, that to keep 
Chautemps and Herriot, Daladier and Sarraut out of the government was 
"beyond hLm\all strength" and politically unworkable. He adds, 
IIAlthough Blum the logician must have considered it, Blum the 
practical politician inmediately rejected the possibility. ,,25 
As a result, the Radical Party entered the coalition conscious 
that despite the greater electoral gains of the parties farther left, 
it held the upper hand. The powerful Senate itself was predominantly 
Radical, albeit conservative. Thus when the Spanish Civil War 
erupted, Blum was forced, because of his dependence on the Radical 
Party, to downplay ideology in dealing with the foreign conflict. As 
we have seen, neither the President of the Senate, Jeanneney, nor the 
President of the Chamber , Herr iot, nor the President of the Republic, 
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Lebrun, wanted to risk international war over spain. 26 Camille 
Chautemps likewise shared the Parliament's worries. He once took 
aside same young Radicals, telling them the Spanish Government would 
fall "like a pack of cards. ,,27 While Blum was in London on July 24, 
Daladier was barraged from the Chamber with questions on Spain. He 
received a delegation of Senators from the Right-wing Union 
Rtpublicaine, led by their president, Leon B~rard, an interview which 
Daladier related to Blum. Berard told a journalist that the 
"unanimous opinion" of his group, "an opinion shared by practically 
all my colleagues in the Senate, is that France's duty and interest 
coincided to <::XJInpel her to maintain the strictest neutrality.,,28 
But it was Delbos woo played the crucial, " if not decisi ve, " 
role in the formation o~ French policy towards the Spanish Civil War. 
He was sensitive to British interests and consistently relayed them to 
Blum. 30 
Yet how must the Radical Party be blamed? While all the noise 
on Spain made headlines, Cot and Daladier continued to send shipments 
of arms to Spain. The French government pursued two policies. Even 
Delbos supported, at least until August 7, selling arms as long as the 
fascist governments did also. He reversed Cot's policy when he 
learned of the strong feelings in the Senate against delivering the 
materiel. 3l Many Radicals especially did not want French foreign 
policy to awear ideologically directed. Herriot had told Blum, "Mon 
grand, don't get mixed up in this affair, it would be extremely 
dangerous, and you cannot do it on the the basis of your politics. ,,32 
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In a 1938 article, Blum denied the comnent that "certain Radical 
ministers" were consistently against him on nonintervention. On the 
oontrary, wrote Blum, "their opinion was one of the determining 
elements" to the August 7 decision. 33 Blum seems to be lying in two 
respects. First, same Radicals in the cabinet, such as Cot, were in 
fact against nonintervention. Second, Blum assumes full 
responsibility for the decision, though in truth he was originally 
reluctant. Why did Blum respond to the oamment in this way? For one, 
the accusation implied, to Blum, that French democracy was a 
"fiction". Also, the French decision-makers on August 7 had grounds 
to believe the international accords brought about b¥ the 
nonintervention plan would be observed. In short, it should only be 
necessary to know that tqe decision was finalized by the cabinet. 34 To 
divide the Popular Front into its component parts is immaterial to 
Blum, since only one policy decision must emerge. 
If the Radical Party was not the only determinant to Blum's 
policy, was Blum's awn Socialist Party at all influential? What was 
the SFIO's influence on the policy of nonintervention? TO what extent 
did it affect Blum (and the future of the party)? 
The focus of discussion on oonservative pressure on Blum has 
often obscured the tensions which existed among the Socialists and 
which were acutely felt by their leader, Blum. Even the usually 
thorough Colton overlooks Paul Faure, a socialist who did support 
nonintervention. Faure represented the very real Socialist dilemma 
Blum faced, of wanting to support the struggling new Republic of 
Spain, and also maintain domestic and foreign peace. 
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Blum and Faure held the diverse elements of the party together. 
But although the SFIO united under Blum in the Rassemblement 
Populaire, the increased international tension began to pull the party 
apart. 35 Both Blum and Faure, who represented the majority center of 
the Party still spoke of disarmament in 1933, but Blum began to 
advocate a tripartite defensive alliance of France, England, and 
Russia, in early 1935. 36 Faure, however, was an uncompromising 
pacifist; he refused to consider the use of force unless France 
herself was attacked. 37 Domestic political tensions also split the two 
leaders. Blum, for instance, had resolutely endorsed the general 
strike of February 12, 1934, called against the fascist leagues, over 
the objections of Faure, who feared the national guard. 38 In addition, 
"Paul Faure never forgot that he was already one of the leaders of the 
left of the party when Blum was still bnmersed in the troubled waters 
of the union sacrie. ,,39 
The small revolutionary left of the SFIO was almost 
indistinguishable fram the Communists. Jean zyromski was ready to 
defend the Soviet Union militarily if necessary, while Marceau Pivert 
denounced provoking war, including with Germany. He resigned from the 
Popular Front government in February 1937 in opposition to the war 
credits passed. Never ~uld he help "furnish arms to the enemies of 
the ~rking class ••• The Rassemblement Populaire was not created to 
make the proletariat swallow the pill of military credits and national 
unity. 1140 But he did discreetly support the nonintervention agreement 
because of his pacifism. 4l The Spanish War was but one issue in the 
brief history of the Popular Front that eventually led the SFIO to a 
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"public split, which ruined the SFIO as a viable political party.,,42 
That decisive issue was Munich and the problem of possible war in 
1938. 
The oamplexity of party disunity between 1933 and 1938 cannot be 
underestimated. The Popular Front was elected at a time when 
Socialists had to reconcile at least three important threats: the 
threat to the domestic peace of France, the threat to the peace of 
Europe, and above all the threat of rival mystiques on the Left and 
Right vying for the same consti tuences. Marcus does not see these as 
reconcilable: 
For the socialists, the problem of mystique vs. 
politique remained acute. This interplay of 
Socialist ideals and French politics has furthered 
the development of a number of distinct socialist 
mystiques, many of them operating within the SFIO 
under the appearance of a cammon denominator of 
class-war formulas. Contradictions at this 
fundamental level made perrnanen~3contradictions of 
policies virtually a necessity. 
The Communists and the Radicals were better able, during the interwar 
period, to separate mystique from politique. The Communists clearly 
set their priority as anti-fascism, while the Radicals were loosely 
organized and distrusted doctrinaire leadership anyway.44 
In the middle, Blum was essentially groping for a justifiable 
unity between ~stique and politique. He found that synthesis in 
patriotism. His rhetoric was often vague as a result. For . example, 
he shouted over the applause, from the podium of the Place de la 
Nation on July 14, 1936, "The object of the Rassernblement Populaire is 
to furnish new reasons to defend it. That is how to revive the great 
revolutionary tradition. That is why the day of July 14 is at once 
the celebration of the Revolution and yours.,,45 
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Although he continued to assert that the Popular Front coalition 
saved France from the "condition of Franco's Spain," he regretted the 
confusion that separated Socialism from the people, especially on the 
issue of national defense. In 1941, he came to believe the Party 
\~uld have been better off to have openly divided, rather than to 
remain "internally split ••• condemned to pcMerlessness and almost 
silence," as it was at the eve of W:>r Id War II. Between 1936 and 1938 
the Party led a humiliated, suspect existence, of a 
sort that no one could perceive its presence. 
Surely, it .would have been better had a frank break 
separated the irreconcilable elements. The event 
should have been the proof; the popular masses 
would have re-formed around those who saw 
clearly ••• To that, I had already ~nfessed, but the 
religion of unity was too strong. 
His judgment on the unity of the SFIO could apply more generally 
to the French Left of the interwar years. The failure of the 
Conmunists, the Socialists, am the Radicals to "see clearly," to 
become a Popular Front in spir it as well as in name, precluded the 
possibility of a strong stand on the Spanish Civil War issue. This 
stalemate in unity ultbnately facilitated the 1940 collapse of France. 
Wrote Blum, "At the hour when the nation was waiting for an aweal, 
for a rallying cry, none was heard from our ranks.,,47 
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CHAPl'ER 5 
Blum and the French Military 
An historian of French foreign policy, Robert Young, has 
recently ·shared striking evidence on Blum's relations with the French 
military: 
The stunning fact is that in this crucial 
three-week period, preceding the nonintervention 
decision, the government failed to consult the 
French chiefs of staff on the precise nature of the 
strategic menace or on the ki~s of operations 
which could be mounted against it. 
Young concludes fran this that "while prepared to justify his policy 
in terms of military exigencies, it seems unlikely that (Blum) was so 
susceptible to their dictates.,,2 To what extent was Blum in fact 
influenced by the "strategic menace" of the Spanish Civil War? What 
"lessons" did the French military derive fran the Spanish War? Did 
Blum exert sufficient authority over the military? If not, why not? 
The Spanish Civil War had two main ramifications for French 
foreign diplanacy. The first was that it put new strains on any kind 
of French-Italian accord. The Popular Front had departed from its 
63 
ideology in hesitatingly declining to aid a fellow leftist government. 
Given the predicament of the Blum goverrnnent, now bitterly denounced 
by all communists and many socialists, it was inconceivable to press 
on with an alliance with Italy.3 
The second ramification of the Civil War, and subject of this 
chapter, was more strategic. Since France was to discontinue courting 
Italy (particularly after the announcement of the Rome-Berlin axis in 
the Fall of 1936), she would have to reinforce her troops on the 
Spanish border , at the expense of divisions against Germany, in the 
event of a rebel victory.4 Furthermore, Blum was quick to identify the 
threat of a tightening of cammunications and access lanes between 
France and North Africa. "Fascist" control over the Gibraltar straits 
b¥ means of German and Italian naval bases in the Balearics and the 
Canaries was an "extremely grave danger not only for France, but for 
England," Blum apprised his Labour Party friend Noel-Baker. 5 There 
\fiOuld be no guarantee that France could ferry her North African 
troops, without changing the mobilization plan. 6 
These concerns led Blum and British Foreign Minister Eden to 
conclude that if the spanish goverrnnent won, the international 
situation would remain the same. If the rebels won, Franco might 
eject foreign troops from Spain. "Not until he proved willing to 
cooperate with Germany and Italy against French interests in the 
Mediterranean would the risks of neutrality overshadow the risks of 
intervention." 7 Conversely, premature intervention would run greater 
risks, above all the threat of international war. Second, 
intervention might prejudice Franco in favor of Germany and Italy, not 
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lead him to evict those pJWers. Finally, a mili tary oper ation w:::>uld 
divert France fram the far greater dangers over the Rhine. 8 Thus the 
consequences of intervention appeared much more hazardous than those 
of nonintervention. 
This scenario was influenced by the French military. It foresaw 
a rebel victory. Andre" Blumel, Bltml' s chef de cabinet, reported to 
the American charge Wilson that "the opinion of the French military 
advisers was in general pessimistic as to the chances of the success 
of the Spanish Government. The Spanish Governmental forces had plenty 
of enthusiasm but no discipline or military order. ,,9 
The sympathies of the French military to either party in the 
Spanish war were strangely conflicting and ambiguous. After Bltml told 
Noel-Baker of the ~trategic danger of a Franquist-Italian 
rapprochement in the Mediterranean, Noel-Baker asked, "Do you have the 
support of your military authorities in this regard?" Bltml answered: 
I don't know exactly what our army chief-of-staff 
thinks. I'm not sure he's totally convinced, but I 
can tell you, assure you, that our major general of 
the £a-vy, Admiral Dar Ian , thinks exactly as I 
do .•• 
~ important cabinet meetings, July 25 and August 1, on the possible 
implications of French involvement in the Spanish Civil War, and Bltml 
admits to being unaware of the positions of his generals! 
On the armed forces, however, General Gamelin later admi tted 
that "for reasons of sentiment and conviction, the sympathies of the 
soldiers were always with Franco. ,,11 But Andrd Bltmlel had told Wilson 
that although the French army officers were "in the majority 
instinctively unsympathetic to the aims of the Bltml government in 
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France, and could not by the wildest stretch of the imagination be 
suspected of any natural sympathy with the efforts of the Left 
government in Spain to put down the mili tary revolt there, " 
nonetheless "for reasons of a technical nature related to the problem 
of French security the French military and naval command were heart 
and soul in favor of the ultimate triumph of the Spanish Goverrnnent." 
The "technical reasons" referred to involved the difficulties "in 
which France would be placed if communications with North Africa's 
reservoir of men and foodstuffs were cut off from continental 
France. ,,12 
It would seem, then, that the strategic bnperatives of France 
cancelled out the military's symphathies with the rebels. If the 
French military could hav.e been swayed either way, Blum must have been 
swayed by factors other than the views of the military, such as by 
domestic politics and the British influence. For instance, Pierre Cot 
of Aviation pointed out that the accusation of French opponents that 
intervention would provoke German and Italian reaction "was not only 
legally unacceptable but actually inaccurate"; these powers were 
intervening anyway.13 But the possibility of a Blum resignation, 
resulting fram increasing public, cabinet and parliamentary division, 
and Delbos ' s and Gamelin's own opposition to "ideological crusading", 
weighed more heavily than the logic of merely being able to openly 
sell arms to a friendly goverrnnent. 14 
Anti-communism also blinded the conservative British and French 
elements to the strategic threat of a potentially fascist Spain. The 
British felt that non-involvement would probably lead to a rebel 
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victory, and then an ouster of all foreigners , including Communists, 
from Spain. Sir S. Hoare explained further: 
When I speak of "neutrality" I mean strict 
neutr~lity, that is to say, a situation in which 
the Russians neither officially or unofficially 
give help to the Comnllnists. On no account must we 
do anything to bolster up Ccmnunism in Spain, 
particularly when it is remembered that Communism 
in Portugal, to which it ~uld probably spread and 
particularly in Lif!?,n, would be a grave danger to 
the British Empire. 
The French army, sympathetic to Franco, also failed in some 
measure to deterrrdne the 'consequences of a German-Italian-supported 
victory. Like Britain, it counted on the rapprochement possible with 
Italy. TO the retired general Castelnau, a hero of the First World 
War, the conflict in Spain was "between Muscovite bar bar ism and 
Western Civilization." He coined the term "Frente Crapular" in the 
Echo de Paris, "the rrost widely read daily paper aJIK)l1g French 
officers.,,16 The historian William Shirer asserts, "A few planes, a 
few tanks, a few batteries of artillery, a scattering of 
I technicians I, rushed over the oorder, as Bltnn had fIrst planned, 
~uld have enabled the Spanish Republic to quash the rebellion in a 
few days or weeks, before the aid from Italy and Germany, which were 
further away, could come by sea to save the military junta. ,,19 Jean 
Zay and Pierre Cot and other Young Turks in the government inclined to 
this assessment. Cot said "leaving the French frontier open to the 
Spanish republicans ~uld have been their salvation." The German army 
had only just achieved parity with the French, and Italy was still 
exhausted from the Ethiopian campaign the year before. A risk of 
World War II in 1936 rather than three years later hardly existed to 
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Cot. 18 But General Gamelin did not even mention Spain in his 
voluminous memoires until the Republican cause was all but lost in 
1938. At that point in March 1938 under Blum's second short-lived 
ministry Gamelin finally saw the necessity of a "diplomatic means to 
separate Germany and Italy" from Spain. 19 
Irony lies in General Gamelin's priding himself before Blum on 
keeping the military "ab::>ve politics" while Petain and Laval were 
beginning to "sprout the seeds of authoritarianism" in supporting 
Franco during the Spanish Civil War. 20 While Blum reassured Gamelin 
that he understocxl the "gravity" of the German threat in Europe, 
former Prime Minister Laval and Marshal pefain dealt secretly with the 
Nazi government through Salamanca. On April 13, 1937, Laval met with 
Franco, the German Arnbas~ador in Spain reported. 
The French statesman brought out the serious 
internal situation in France and the imminence of 
a Corrmunist movement in that country, and stated 
that he was in touch with Doriot, Colonel La Rocque 
(lfladers of two rightist parties), and Marshal 
petain. • •• M. Laval was of the -""opinion that the 
salvation of France lay in a Petain government am 
that the Marshal was determined to assume this 
responsibility, but that President (sic) Blum, wham 
he compared to Alcala Zamora, and with wham they 
were secretly working ~ this end, did not seem 
inclined to accept it. 
But, to be fair, P~tain did not openly resist Blum, even at the 1938 
meeting on Spain. Pertinax recalls: 
Not a word did he utter against the Jew, whom he 
jailed, condemned am abandoned to the Nazis. Yet 
at the same time the Jew was importunate, 
repeatedly asking him, seeing that he was silent, 
"Are you thoroughly in agreement Marshal? •• Haven ' t 
you any objections to express?" "None whatever, Mr. 
Prime Minister, none whatever 22 And he answered in a tone of deferential regard. 
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"Obviously, " adds Pertinax, "pttain did not speak as he felt and 
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thought. II In the sumner of 1936, Petain met a former Br i tish minister, ., 
Lord Mottistone, and remarked, "We have a rotten government and I want 
to tell you that the French people won't fight." Pertinax remarked 
that Petain did not change between 1936 and 1938; "he always stood 
where Anglophobia, oounterrevolutionary passion, and defeatism met. 1123 
How much control did Blum have over the military, then? Would 
he have had the support of the French armed forces in Spain had 
intervention led to war? A French military attache to the French 
embassy in Madrid addressed Blum: liThe King of France would have 
intervened. ,,24 But the sovereign of a country is not like the leader 
of a coalition, particularly if that leader is committed to democracy 
and to enhancing the ,credibility of the new socialist-headed 
government by not appearing to be militantly crusading the socialist 
ideology. The unknowns of intervention were too grave to risk; Blum 
was not bold on military aid to Spain until 1938, after the Anschluss 
a""1d the fall of Guernica and Saragossa. 25 
The military's lack of commitment to the Spanish cause may have 
lain not in private sympathies nor in ignorance of the strategic 
interest France had in a non-fascist aligned Spain but in a fear of 
German rearmament, and the conviction that keeping allies were the 
lynchpins to France ' s oollective security. Though the Blum government 
did embark on a massive rearmament program, the Left's rhetoric was 
still disarmament arrl the military doctr ine was still defensive. In 
1935, when Paul Reynaud advocated that France change her mili tary 
policy, General Maurin, the Minister of War, had answered, IIWhen one 
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has spent millions to have good and solid fortifications , one does not 
commit the folly of going beyond these fortifications to 
who-kn~s-what kind of adventure.,,26 
Had the French military establishment believed as had Colonel de 
Gaulle in the breakthrough powers of offensive weapons, particularly 
in the hands of an enemy with superior resources , it would, on the 
contrary, have constituted a prediction of military disaster for 
France. Thus it was, writes Young, "that the high conmand 
reconsidered, then reaffirmed, its doctrine in 1936.,,27 
If nonintervention was meant to enhance France's waning prestige 
before her East European allies, the opposi te, if any change, 
occurred. Poland, for example, wanted France to help subsidize her 
arms industry with prototypes as w~ll as money. Blum consulted his 
generals and they refused to supply the prototypes. The generals also 
did not consider the USSR of prime strategic ~rtance. They did not 
see how Russia could act directly against Germany given the wall of 
states between the two countries, Russia'S shaky relations with 
Poland, and the ongoing purges of their generals. After learning of 
the generals' opinions on Poland, Blum, exasperated, told Daladier and 
Gamelin: 
One cannot live this way. Weare linked by an 
alliance with a state and a people, and we have so 
little confidence in them that we hesitate to 
deliver them arms, designs, projects, for f2~ they 
will betray us and deliver us to the enemy. 
What "lessons" did the French military learn fran observing the 
new warfare in Spain? General Arroengaud wrote in 1937 that the 
battles in Spain "confirm our CMn experience (of the First World War) , 
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the value of the dispositions we undertook to prevent a quick attack" 
h the f t t ed to h f t ·· '30 w en war 0 movemen urn t e war 0 at rltlon. Instead of 
focussing on German speed am concentration in Spain, the generals 
explained the victories of the offensive there to inadequate numbers 
of defensive weapons or to the certain peculiarities inherent to the 
war in Spain. Conversely, the successes of artillery, anti-tank guns, 
and anti-aircraft artillery were used to confirm the correctness of 
the French war doctrine. 31 General Beaufre recounts in his memoires of 
an instance in June or July 1936 when British Chief of the Imperial 
Staff Deverell asked General Gamelin what he thought of the German 
tanks in Spain. Gamelin replied, "All our information indicates that 
our policy is the right one. The German tanks, too lightly armored, 
are scrap iron.,,32 
All the same, the battles in Spain demonstrated to Armengaud the 
need for a "counter-offensive on fortified lines." The principle 
lesson, to Armengaud, was similar to what was learned on the western 
Front in the last months of World War I: "Our idea is confirmed that 
the eventual adversary of our country will not attack, if there is no 
hope of surpr ise. " In other w::>rds, the French oorders must be 
well-organized on :the defensive. 33 
How did he evaluate the new air forces of Germany, Italy, and 
the Soviet Union? The spanish Civil War was one of the first 
instances of extensive air raids. Likewise, the general repeated that 
the defensive strategy for aviation was the lesson. The nationalist 
air force in Biscaye, for instance, was all-p:Merful "when it was not 
countered" by goverrunent planes and anti-aircraft defense. 34 What was 
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the message to France? To catch up in aviation. He concluded from 
the Spanish Civil War maneuvers, that peace in Europe lay in an 
"equilibrium of air forces," which must be achived "at any price. ,,35 
In a word, instead of emphasizing a positive solution to the problem 
of German rearmament, the French Generals (and members of Blum's 
cabinet) reemphasized, using the Spanish example, the deterrent value 
of a strong coalition defense. 
The field of military economy is quite new, and although 
per ipheral to this study, it may shed some light as to why the 
military behaved as it did toward involvement in the Spanish war. To 
what extent were the internal responses of the Blum government as well 
as of all other French interwar governments, predicated upon the slow 
progress of an industri~ strategy for wartime? To .what extent was 
government policy on Spain influenced by the export and investment 
interests of French armament, shipbuilding and aircraft industries?36 
Before the Spanish Civil War, France bought a considerable amount of 
iron from Spain. That market was replaced by North Africa. But in 
times of war, due to potential difficulties in conmunicating with 
North Africa, it would be nore practical to deal with Spain. Spain 
also exported copper, 20, 000 tons, indispensable for national 
defense. 37 A definite correlation between these interests and. the 
attitudes of Blum and the French military is difficult to establish. 
But Socialist leader Paul Faure has cynically described the war 
mater iel manufacturers as "the .true internationalists." Blum does 
point out that the French war industrialist Ie Creusot tried to get 
Ambassador Potemkin of Russia to pressure Blum not to nationalize 
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French industry, promising to sell Russia more arms if nationalization 
did not occur. 38 
The French military differed over Spain. Some generals were 
clear partisans of Franco. Others thought the risks of intervention 
were too great, especially since their defensive military doctrine 
called for elaborate border preparations, maintaining the bulk of 
French reserves on the German border to resist a strong Germany. 
Still others were content to stand pat, though noting the new 
offensive tank and airforce strategies, reconvinced of the need for a 
strong French defense. 
What if the Popular Front had resigned over Spain? What would 
Daladier' s authority as Minister of National Defense have meant to the 
military if the president of the Radical Party moved from government 
to opposition?49 The air force, in spite of Pierre Cot, was inclined 
to the right. The navy, in spite of Darlan, "was the body which was 
soon to be the framework for the most reactionary regime in 
contemporary France: Vichy. ,,40 We know li ttle about the army except 
that Marshal Petain later became ambassador to Franco. One general 
accused the Popular Front of encouraging laziness and "incapable 
cornnanders." Because the workers got out of hand, the former bosses 
unlearned the art of giving oammands. 41 
Blum later claimed that France was "on the eve of a military 
/ 
~ d'etat, a counterpart to the Franco ~ de force. Industrial and 
reactionary circles, infuriated by the passage of social laws, would 
have utilized this (the Spanish Civil War) as a pretext (for a ~). 
I had a presentiment of it at the time. Since then I knCM it.,,42 
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The French rrdlitary, however, has usually been included in the 
long list of reactionary groups, at least from the perspective of the 
Spanish Civil War, than as a force to contend with in its own right. 
The attitude of the military toward the strategic threat posed by 
Spain and the generals' influence on Blum remains little known and 
understood. What is clear is that Blum, like the military (exciuding 
de Gaulle), did not consider the possibility of a defensive war fought 
in Spain on behalf of the Spanish Republic, to counter the threat of a 
third fascist front on the French border. 
rnAPTER 6 
The British Influence on French Nonintervention 
The outoame of the Spanish War was settled in 
London, Paris, Rane, Berlin - at any rate, not in 
Spain. 
- G. Orwelll 
74 
The extent of British influence on the decision of the French 
. / I Prerru.er Leon B um not to intervene on the Republican side of the 
Spanish Civil War is perhaps the most controversial issue in the study 
of Blum's action as a statesman. Revisionists have reexamined the 
diplomatic papers of the tilne, made publicly available in the last 
twenty years, and have found that the allegations of British coercion 
were excuses to divert attention from the tense domestic politics. As 
Young writes, if Britain swung the French decision-makers, it was more 
as icing on the French g$teau. 2 But this interpretation still does not 
answer the question of how ~rtant was the issue of British support, 
and how did Blum interpret and respond to Br i tish pressure. Blum 
himself always assumed the responsibility for the nonintervention 
agreement. 3 On the British side, the Secretary of the Foreign Office 
Anthony Eden, likewise denied the French acted on his government's 
.. 
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directive, and added, "I should have been glad to say that 
nonintervention was my proposal, as I considered it the .best which 
could have been devised in the circumstances. ,,4 
Other witnesses, however, such as Pierre Cot, stressed the 
importance Blum and Delbos attached to strengthening the British 
alliance and to the almost "unconscious reflection" of British 
sympathy to the rebels. "Rightly or wrongly," Cot explained, "it 
looked as if the nonintervention policy would be the only way of 
preventing Hitler from aiding Franco. ,,5 But would England have 
isolated France had an international conflict arisen? 
Whom do we believe, Blum, Eden or Cot? First, Blum's goals for 
better Anglo-French relations will be examined. Next, we will see why 
Britain harbored reservations on intervention. Finally, we will seek 
to deterrrdne whether Blum and France could have proceeded to act on 
their own initiative, if Blum had done this, and why. 
France just after World War I was "the greatest power on the 
continent of Europe," remembered Shirer. 6 She was rich, maintained a 
proud army on the Rhine and controlled colonies in parts of Africa and 
Asia. But by the 1930s, France's credibility as protector over her 
allies on the continent declined. When the Popular Front assumed 
power, relations with Great Britain were shaky. In 1935, Laval had 
refused to impose sanctions on Italy over the invasion of Ethiopia, 
against Britain's wishes, just as London likewise had done little to 
condemn Germany over the occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936. 
Great Britain also signed an agreement to lbnit naval weapons with 
Germany without consulting France. Same British conservative circles 
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even favored an Anglo-Gerrnan entente over one with the leftist French 
government. 7 
Meanwhile, a Belgium nervous about both French and British 
inaction, as well as with the powerlessness of the League of Nations 
and the failure of the ongoing disarmament talks, decided to both 
break her alliance with France and Britain and ask them to preserve 
her neutrality. The Petite Entente of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and 
Ranania worried about France's ability to protect it both fran Germany 
in Czechoslovakia's case, and in the cases of Poland and Romania, from 
Russia, with wham they feared France had a conflicting alliance.8 
The lowered status of France "anguished" the new visionary 
Premier of France. Blum sensed in the turn of events 
a new sign, a new symptom of that type of 
progressive breakdown of all our European 
positions, not only materially but politically. 
Symbolically, it wa~ a sign of change and the 
prophesy of danger. 
The sun was likewise setting on the British Empire. Britain 
turned inward while she strove to maintain her political and economic 
ties with her colonies. After World War I, Britain's finances were 
depleted and unemployment high. Though Britain still maintained her 
great navy, her army, like that of the United States, was totally 
disbanded. lO Eden on his side criticized the resultant growing British 
isolationism ·as "unrealistic," especially after Hitler's aggression in 
the Rhineland in March 1936. In truth, the League of Nations had came 
to "depend for its survival upon close Anglo-French cooperation. ,,11 
Thus Blum set out to strengthen the alliance with Britain, which 
had already begun to revive with the previous Rad i cal-COnser vat ive 
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Sarraut government. 12 Blum confided to Eden, the British statesman 
reports, his fear that British public opinion: 
was at the moment making the same mistake about 
Hitler as French public opinion had made about 
Italy; the latter had attempted to secure 
Mussolini's support against Hitler, and now it 
looked as though we were attempting to secure 
Hitler's support against Mussolini. I 1jsured Blum 
that no such intention was in our mind. 
Britain had strategic as well as ideological interests in 
standing clear of Spain during the Civil War. As early as June 23, 
1936 an envoy described "the chances of parliamentary government 
surviving" as "very slight." He added, in the same memo to the 
Secretary of state for Foreign Affairs Eden, that 
British firms in Spain have had their share of the 
difficulties resulting from the labour unrest and 
from the recent Government legislation, and our 
Embassy has been active in protesting to the 
Spanish Government against .the application to 
British firms of the Provisions of the Decree of 
February 29th, the enforcement of which has been 
placed in the hands of popularly elected local 
cammissi~ns, from whose decision there is no 
appeal. 
The envoy noted the grCMing "anti -foreign feeling" in Spain and 
made quite clear the British interest in a stable, friendly 
government: 
So long as the Spanish Government fails to put its 
own house in order and to regain its authority, 
there is little hope of obtainigg any real 
satisfaction for British interests. 
According to Eden and to most British historians, 
nonintervention did not originate from British pressure, nor was 
Britain entrenched in the Franquist camp. And while Eden's first move 
was to ensure the safe exodus of Br i tish subj ects from Spain, he told 
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the Spanish Ambassador on July 25 that the British government "~uld 
not obstruct the provision of supplies," including arms and munitions, 
to the Spanish Government. 16 Britain also continued to sell oil to the 
Spanish Republic. 17 
If Eden can be believed and Great Britain did not in fact 
initiate the French nonintervention policy or sympathy with Franco, 
Britain nonetheless made clear her unwillingness to be on the side of 
a "conmunist takeover. " Admiral Lord Chatfield had assumed the 
conflict in Spain was between the equally unsympathetic ccmnunists and 
fascists. By contrast, his French counterpart, Admiral Darlan, tried 
unsuccessfully to convince him a democratic government did exist in 
Spain and mentioned the possibility of London-Paris mediation to save 
't 18 1 • 
Thomas Jones, former Deputy Secretary to the British cabinet who 
remained close with Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, noted in his diary 
on July 27: " ••• S.B. was much affected by the Spanish troubles. 'I 
told Eden yesterday that on no account, French or other, must he 
brings us in to fight on the side of the Russians.' ,,19 Four days 
later, Winston Churchill, then a conservative MP, wrote Corbin, the 
French Ambassador in London, "I am sure if France sent airplanes, etc. 
to the present Madrid Government, and the Germans and Italians pushed 
in from the other angle, the dominant forces here ~uld have been with 
Germany and Italy, and estranged from France." 20 
"On no account must we do anything to bolster up Conmunism in 
Spain," said Sir S. Hoare, "especially since it could spread to 
Lisbon" which "would be a grave danger to the British Empire. ,,21 Hoare 
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and Chatfield surmised that in the event England's interests in the 
Mediterranean and on the Cape routes were endangered, Britain could 
easily "send ships, at short notice" but they would be "astonished" if 
Italy and Germany would attempt an attack because of their willingness 
to take part in the ongoing Locarno talks in London and to resume 
"friendly relations.,,22 
The most logical argument, and I think convincing fran the 
French perspective, for nonintervention, was addressed to Delbos by 
Sir George Clerk on August 7. In fact, according to Dreifort, it had 
"a significant impact" on Delbos's commitment that evening to a formal 
French-directed policy of nonintervention. Clerk had asked him "how 
he was sure that the government in Madrid was the real government and 
not the screen behind ' which the most anarchistic elements in Spain 
were directing events?" He pointed out no law and order existed in 
Madrid. But here was the clincher: 
I must put before him the danger of any action 
which might definitely oammit the French government 
to one side of the conflict and to make more 
difficult the close cooperation between ou23two countries which was .called for by this crisis. 
Delbos thanked him for his openness and that he "wished nothing more 
than that the two Governments should act together as closely as 
possible." Delbos viewed Franco's possible Mediterranean concessions 
to Germany and Italy with "anxiety." Clerk responded 
••• 1 had reason to believe that the extremists in 
the Government were putting increasing pressure on 
M. Blum and I felt sure what I said might 
strengthen the hands of the moderate and sober 
elements. 
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After this interview the Foreign Office noted that Sir G. Clerk ' s 
language "is approved and appears to have had gCXJd result.,,24 
Still, it seems TImpossible to avoid the impression that the 
French were too . easily convinced by Britain. Eden was clear on the 
British "rubber stamp": Blum "and Delbos knew only too well that any 
other course of action would sharply divide France, while open 
intervention by the great powers could lead to a European war. We 
agreed with this French decision of policy.,,25 In Eden's view, then, 
Britain's agreement with Blum had 00 bearing on whether or not France 
would adopt a nonintervention policy. 
So why did the legend of British pressure on Blum and Delbos 
gain popular credence? I am inclined to agree with Young and Carlton, 
that the British position was a pretext for the Po~ar Front. 
Just as Blum's self-confessed lack of consultation 
with his military advisers raises doubt about the 
importance he appeared to attribute to strategic 
concerns, so too the lack of British pressure in 
late July-early August simply must weaken the 
contention that Fran26 ultimately bowed to British pressure and demands. 
According to Young, the Popular Front, like the previous Sarraut 
government, took advantage of the French citizen's legitimate concern 
for national security and the British alliance, to detract attention 
from the .potential split of the Popular Front cabinet. The 
unsuccessful Darlan mission represented the failure of the government 
to do so. Britain hardly forced France into nonintervention and came 
nowhere near the kind of armrtwisting used on Laval on Ethiopia in 
1935. 27 
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Young's theory is convincing and attractive, but it fails to 
take into account that Blum himself did not hesitate to publicly 
assume the responsibility of nonintervention, and why he did so. 
Judging from the way Blum withstood opposition throughout his 
political career -- he was even physically assaulted in February 1936 
it seems unlikely Blum would have adopted an opportunistic excuse 
for the policy. The Popular Front foreign policy objectives that he 
enunciated on June 23 before the Senate clearly indicated that the 
then unforseen policy in Spain had a precedent in the Popular Front 
Platform. 
We do not intend to hold any crusade other than the 
reconciliation of peoples, without exclusion. 
Propaganda or the battle for whateve28 political system must not be the pretext for war. 
(Significantly, he mentioned Jaures a few times). In this light, the 
nonintervention policy can be seen as a deliberate, inevitable act, 
a~d not as a desperate effort to save the Popular Front, along with 
its new social laws, from falling. 
But would Britain really have abandoned Blum had he decided to 
go ahead with intervention? Cot thought not. 
England would not have abandoned France in case of 
actual danger, because her interest would have 
forbidden such a rove; it would have been 
impossible for her to remain out of a European war 
that was bound to result in a redistribution of 
international power.' She would have followed us 
unwillingly, but she would have followed. Instead 
of an Anglo-French policy directed by the English 
conservatives, we would have had an international 
policy oriented by the Popular Front am suffered 
by the British conservatives. Democracy and the 
peoples of the B2~tish empire would have gained 
from the change. 
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Also, given what we know fram Britain's participation in the Lacarno 
talks of 1925 and July 1936, from Britain's economic and military 
decline, and her rising interest in the friendship of a democratic 
France (not strongly allied to the Soviet Union) and to the Churchill 
after 1936, it is likely Britain would at the very least not have 
taken the German side. But how effective would that British 
intervention have been? Great Britain's armaments production did not 
reach parity with France until 1938. 
"gained time" for Britain. 3D 
The nonintervention agreement 
Hindsight tells us that nonintervention was wrong because the 
fascist forces triumphed eventually, that Hitler and Mussolini were 
strengthened, and Britain and France humbled. Yet as American 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull reflected, "this argument would be 
valid only if the peace-loving nations, including the United States, 
had been prepared militarily and psychologically to abandon their 
effort toward maintaining peace and embark on a general preventive 
war. Such was not the case.,,3l And who was going to risk a preventive 
war in 1936? France and Britain (and Russia), the protectors of peace 
in Europe, were not. 
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CONCLUSION 
Did Blum react consistently with his Socialist principles in the 
agreement not to intervene in the Spanish Civil War? Did he act 
reluctantly, bowing to pressure? 
First, it is clear ,that Blum adopted the nonintervention policy 
with the greatest reluctance. Most of Blum's compatriots, primarily 
his former ministers Pierre Cot and Andre Blumel, and Fernando de los 
Rios, Jiminez de Asua, and Julio Just of the Spanish Republican 
government, had only praise and sympathy for Blum's humaneness. They 
separate the treaty fram him, and characterize it as the sum total of 
domestic and foreign pressures on the Popular Front. l Pierre Mendes 
France was Blum's only close associate who continued to believe 
military aid in July and August 1936 would have effectively benefitted 
the Republic. This is to forget that at the time, all of the Madrid 
leaders, except for Negrin, did not themselves consider the affair 
significant. Also, this focus an military aid excludes other formulas 
of intervention: the simple opening of borders to free trade , or the 
immediate execution of France's 1935 war materiel treaties with 
Spain. 2 
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To others, that Blum suffered deeply because of the turn of 
events does not excuse him. Colton and Lacouture agree with Alvarez 
del Vayo's judgment: 
That he felt this despair attested to his deep 
sensitivity but does not absolve Leon Blum from the 
political responsibility he incurred when he gave 
his name and that of the Frenc~ Socialist Party to 
the farce of non-intervention. 
Pertinax criticizes Blum's intellectualism and his escapes into 
abstractions. Blum closed himself off from the public: "He had to 
painfully gird himself whenever he felt action had to be taken.- He is 
the French Pythagoras. He believed that divine numbers rule the 
world. ,,4 
Although nonintervention revealed itself to be indeed a farce, 
Blum acted fully conscious of the forces that could drive the country 
and the thin hope of international peace asunder. The Spanish Civil 
War divided the Left in France, whose support Blum had to have in 
order to govern at all. 5 Same Left Socialists and Communists, such as 
the Comnunist leader Maurice Thorez, denounced nonintervention, "that 
juridical monstrosity which is assassinating our Spanish brothers.,,6 
Others, such as Paul Faure, were ardent proponents of peace at any 
price. The majority of the Left, including Blum, continued to believe 
in nonintervention as the expression of collective security, the 
ability of grouped nations to effectively pressure the aggressor. 
Unilateral action of France in Spain would risk the British alliance, 
the touchstone, rightly or wrongly, of French foreign policY. 
Furthermore, to Jaure\ian Socialists, the unity of nations would lead 
to world peace which would in turn lead to Socialist revolution. The 
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pacifism of the Right was simpler: why fight to preserve a 
potentially Communist government? Above all, in order to understand 
the domestic turmoil of France, one must appreciate what Cordell Hull 
had termed the "paralysis" that gripped Europe after the devastation 
and demoralization of the previous war. 
Blum's socialism was conditional to the time and crisis he 
faced, as he had always explained since the "vectorial sum" of 
changing forces metaphor he put forth in 1919. 7 
" Would Jaures have intervened? In a speech at Scissons on 
November 15, 1936, Blum answered no: 
"""' I told him: "But, Jaures, aren't there noments 
where war is necessary! " And I cited sane 
historical examples that had always obsessed me. I 
reminded him of the per iod between February and 
June 1848, which was one of the great historic 
noments of a troubled Europe.. • • And I told 
Jaures: "But, at such a mcment, wasn't it Lamartine 
who was wrong, who betrayed the Republic and the 
Revolution, in proclaiming a policy of 
non-intervention. The workers who, same weeks 
later, fell on Paris in the barricades of June, 
~uld it have been better if they had gone to the 
aid of Germany and Italy ••• " But Jaur~s answered: 
"No! No! that -would not have been better. Any time 
war can be avoided, it must be avoided. War is 
evil! Nothing good and noble can come out of war! 
It is not from war that humans learn goodness! It 
is not war which is revolutionary, it is peace!,,8 
Blum was torn in his own'mind over the issue of when war is or is not 
acceptable. Unfortunately, the absolute bmpossibility of negotiating 
with a Hitler did not hit him until 1938, after the Anschluss, the 
concession of Czechoslovakia to Germany, and the victory of Franco in 
Spain. When it did, however, he did not hesitate to formulate a 
different outlook on national defense. In ~ l'echelle humaine, the 
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culmination of his life's y,ork, written while he was imprisoned by ., 
Vichy, Blum finally and most eloquently resolved in his own mind the 
problem <?f peace. IIExperience teaches,1I he wrote, "that in dreadful 
rnanents of his life, man only saves his life by risking it. 1I9 
He conceded the reality of a IIEurope in arms." Given an armed 
Europe, he continued in ~ l'~helle humaine, there is no other way to 
preserve peace than by a system of "armed mutual assistance" and by 
pacts that are effective only when "each of the peoples who sign it 
are resolved to honor it with their blood. ,,10 He disapproved of those 
who refused to IIdie for Danzig" and perhaps silently referred to his 
own actions during the Spanish Civil War. He is a harsh critic of the 
Left of the 30s: 
The socialists and syndicalists were right to 
preach peace, but they reduced it and were reduced 
themselves by a tone of · false good sense and 
egoism. Courage and the spirit of sacrifice are 
not survivors of barbarism~ what is barbaric is the 
object t~h which Humanity still applies them. (i.e., 
to war). 
Blum had came to recognize that the majority of the left during the 
30s, himself included, shortsightedly sought peace without confronting 
the issue of how to enforce it. The paradox was twofold: that peace 
must be fought for, and that long-term goals could only be achieved 
through squarely resisting the present II bar bar ism, " even if that 
barbarism threatens a nation other than one's own. The Blum of 1941 
would have follCMed through and aided Spain. 
But would the country have let him? The risks of civil war were 
not illusory. Provincial conservatism still predominated in 1936~ the 
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working class was still too poor and isolated to foment and to win 
revolution; the Parliament on which the Popular Front relied was a 
bastion of conservatism; even the Communist Party had turned moderate. 
The nonintervention policy did not radically damage Blum's authOrity 
before the people, as the Luna Park speech demonstrated. Fewer people 
were against the policy than many would like to adrnit. 12 
In foreign affairs, as well as domestic, Blum faced the problem 
of credibility: how was he to instill confidence in a nation with its 
first Socialist and its first Jewish Premier? At the same time, 
international war threatened in 1936, all the more reason to turn to 
an appeasement policy. Italy had invaded Ethiopia in 1935; Germany 
reoccupied the Rhineland in March 1936; Japan was later to join the 
tripartite anticornintern 'pact with Germany and Italy; Stalin began the 
violent purges in the USSR in the summer of 1936: and civil war broke 
out in Spain. 
Resignation was Blum's one viable alternative to the 
nonintervention policy. If Blum had intervened fully in Spain, he 
would not have had the undivided support of his constituency, his 
cabinet, and least of all, Parliament. Perhaps a SOCialist opposition 
group in the Chamber, had Blum resigned or fallen, would have been 
more advantageous to the Republican cause. Along with a large 
fraction of the Radical Party, the mr, and the Ccmnunists, the 
Socialist Party would have challenged the succeeding government as 
much as Blum himself had been pressured. Furthermore, Blum and the 
SFIO would have been spared the stain of the nonintervention policy. 
The new social laws would probably not have been revoked in the wake 
of a united working class opposition. 
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Ironically, the Germans were already prepared to concede a 
Republican victory. In a telegram to the Foreign Ministry on August 
21, 1936, the German Ambassador to France remarked that if the arms 
embargo did not materialize, Blum and DelOOs would no longer be able 
to risk the growing domestic political pressure and would have to 
"give unlimited support to the Spanish Government. II IIFrom 
considerations of geography alone, deliveries from countries which 
sympathize with the rebels could not compete with French support." He 
added that the consequent stream of Red Front volunteers to Spain 
"would then assume such proportions that consequences for foreign 
policy would be incalculable. 1I13 
Why did Blum remain in off ice, then, and succumb not to the 
interventionists on the Left, as Germany feared, but seemingly to a 
more IIprudent" stance? For one, the Spanish Government itself urged 
Blum to stay in power. According to Jiminez de Asua, socialist 
lawyer, a vice president, and author of the Spanish Republican 
Constitution, the spanish Government would rather have kept the 
sympathetic Blum government, than one more outwardly hostile to 
Spanish interests. 14 Secondly, the nonintervention policy seemed 
genuinely viable. Britain and the united States supported the policy, 
along with the Soviet Union. Germany, as we have seen, agreed to the 
policy for fear of French, British and Russian intervention. Thirdly, 
Blum did sincerely believe the policy preserved peace at home and in 
Europe. In Luna Park Blum said that only when he could no longer 
reconcile his Socialist ideals, those of peace and the hope for all 
social classes and nations to cooperate, with his duty as France's 
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leader, would he resign. He almost did so in December 1936, when the 
Communists withheld their vote of confidence in the government due to 
the Popular Front policy on Spain, but he remained after his Spanish 
fr iends repeatedly urged him to do so. 
Blum cannot be judged, then, without taking into account the 
various political, danestic, and ideological forces that both 
influenced and limited Blum in 1936. The Spanish Civil War experience 
taught Blum on the one hand, that with a more pragmatic, "Bismarckian," 
approach, one could correctly perceive the realities of the forces 
that drive people and how a leader could work within these 
limitations. Only with this knowledge in mind can ideals be applied. 
Socialism, like any other ideology, had not came from nowhere but 
itself originated in ,historical events. If any fault can be 
attributed to Blum, it must be too great a faith in the moral 
transformation of humanity. But while that faith, through 
nonintervention, led unwittingly to a defeated Republican Spain, it 
also helped to rally the French Resistance six years later. Pierre 
Mende's France remembers the "poignant feelings" of the free French in 
London toward Blum as he was defending himself before the Vichy 
government: "He was a prisoner on occupied soil and it was he who, 
though the bars of his cell, exhorted us, encouraged us, sustained 
us." 15 
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